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INTRODUCTION 
Can we measure inequity? A naïve response denies the possibility of 
quantification. And yet scholarly and popular discourse abounds with 
numbers purporting to measure inequality, poverty, and other aspects of 
equity. A more sophisticated answer acknowledges the wide use of equity 
metrics, but stresses their plurality. “How to quantify unfairness is a value 
choice. Different numbers mirror different ‘takes’ on the meaning of 
equity. End of story.” 
A yet more nuanced response sees structure in the plurality of equity 
metrics. There are deep, unifying axioms, but divergence with respect to 
the application and specification of those axioms. Seeing both the deep 
consensus, and the differences in specification, helps us think clearly about 
the normative position presupposed by the use of one or another metric. 
That, at least, is the story I will tell here. 
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Has the United States become a less equitable society over the last 
thirty-five years, since the 1970s? Answers to that highly salient question 
illustrate the plurality of tools for quantifying equity. A classic inequality 
metric (such as the Gini coefficient, or the variance-based “coefficient of 
variation”) quantifies the population-wide distribution of some attribute.1 
But which attribute? The inequality of periodic income (in particular, 
annual income) has increased since the 1970s. This is true for different 
definitions of “income.” It is also robust to the choice of inequality metric, 
although metrics that are especially sensitive to what happens at the top of 
the income distribution will record a more dramatic change over the last 
thirty-five years.2 
Wage and wealth inequality have also increased.3 But if we move from 
income, wages, and wealth, to a different indicator of economic well-
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1. See infra Section I.A (describing structure of inequality metrics). 
2. Two detailed studies of U.S. income inequality over the last several decades are REBECCA M. 
BLANK, CHANGING INEQUALITY (2011); Jonathan Heathcote et al., Unequal We Stand: An Empirical 
Analysis of Economic Inequality in the United States, 1967–2006, 13 REV. OF ECON. DYNAMICS 15 
(2010). Heathcote et al. look at a variety of definitions of income (including wage earnings, pre-tax 
income, and disposable income) and a variety of inequality metrics (including the Gini coefficient, 
variance of logarithm, and percentile ratios). They generally find increasing inequality since the 1970s 
(indeed, since the beginning of their time series, in 1967) as illustrated by their figures 8, 9, 11, and 12. 
Blank examines inequality over the period 1979–2007, looking specifically at earnings and “total 
income” (the sum of earnings, government income, and unearned income from other sources), and 
using the Gini, coefficient of variation, and percentile ratios as her inequality metrics. When she looks 
at all adults 18–64 (including nonworking household members allocated a share of household income), 
she finds an increase in all inequality metrics applied to both total annual income and annual earnings. 
See BLANK, supra, at 64–65 tbl.5; cf. id. 30–31 tbl.2 (finding more mixed picture with respect to 
earnings of all workers). See also Jeffrey Thompson & Timothy M. Smeeding, Country Case Study—
USA, in THE GREAT RECESSION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME 202 (Stephen P. 
Jenkins et al. eds., 2013) (measuring income inequality with Gini coefficient and percentile ratios, as 
well as top percentile shares, and finding increasing inequality from 1979 through first years of Great 
Recession). 
  These findings of increasing U.S. income inequality are confirmed in a recent detailed 
comparative analysis that includes U.S. time trends. See Andrea Brandolini & Timothy M. Smeeding, 
Income Inequality in Richer and OECD Countries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY 71, 83 fig.4.2, 88 fig.4.5 (Wiemer Salverda et al. eds., 2009). Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 
using measures of inequality focused on the disparity between top incomes and the rest of the 
population (in particular, top percentile shares), find a very dramatic increase in U.S. income inequality 
from the 1970s through 2007. See Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Top 
Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 3 figs.1, 2 & 3 (2011). Piketty, in his influential 
recent book, extends the timeline through the Great Recession; a dramatic increase in top percentile 
income shares from the 1970s through 2010 can be observed in figures 8.5 through  8.8. See THOMAS 
PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 291–300 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014). The 
figures in Thompson and Smeeding, supra, at 216–217, tell the same story. 
3. On wage inequality, see BLANK, supra note 2, at 30–31 tbl.2; Heathcote, supra note 2, at 23 
fig.4. On wealth inequality, see Fabian T. Pfeffer, Sheldon Danziger & Robert Schoeni, Wealth 
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being—“consumption,” i.e., individual expenditure on goods and 
services—the picture is more muddled. A number of studies find that 
inequality in the population-wide distribution of consumption in the United 
States has increased much less, since the 1970s, than inequality in the 
distribution of income4—although these findings have been contested.5  
Consumption tends to be more stable than income, since individuals can 
borrow and save to “smooth out” transitory changes to income. Relatedly, 
an individual’s lifetime income is arguably better proxied by her periodic 
(e.g., annual) consumption than by her periodic income. Thus, it may be the 
case that lifetime income inequality increased substantially less during the 
period 1980–present, as compared to annual income inequality.6 
What about the poor? Has the degree of poverty gone up or down?  
Poverty metrics, unlike inequality metrics, are “truncated” at the poverty 
line: they ignore the distribution of the relevant attribute above that line.7 
Traditionally, scholarly discussion of poverty—and certainly official 
poverty measurement by the U.S. government—has focused on income as 
the relevant attribute, with the poverty line set either by identifying the 
income required to meet certain needs (for example, nutritional needs), or 
as some fraction of population mean or median income. The headcount 
ratio (the fraction of the population with incomes below the poverty line) is 
the simplest measure of the degree of income poverty.8 The headcount 
ratio, combined with the official U.S. definition of “income” and official 
poverty line, yields an oscillating pattern: from 13% (1980), to 13.5% 
(1990), to 11.3% (2000), to 15.1% (2010).9 Using some alternative 
definitions of “income,” Meyer and Sullivan find an oscillating pattern that 
 
Disparities Before and After the Great Recession, 650 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98 (2013); 
Heathcote, supra note 2, at 42 fig.19. 
4. See ORAZIO P. ATTANASIO, ERICH BATTISTIN & MARIO PADULA, INEQUALITY IN LIVING 
STANDARDS SINCE 1980 (2011); Richard Blundell et al., Consumption Inequality and Partial Insurance, 
98 AM. ECON. REV. 1887 (2008); David S. Johnson et al., Economic Inequality Through the Prisms of 
Income and Consumption, 128 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 11 (2005); Dirk Krueger & Fabrizio Perri, Does 
Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 163 
(2006); Heathcote, supra note 2; Bruce D. Meyer & James X. Sullivan, Consumption and Income 
Inequality in the U.S. Since the 1960s (Apr. 2, 2013) (working paper) 
(http://www3.nd.edu/~jsulliv4/Inequality3.6.pdf). 
5. See Mark A. Aguiar & Mark Bils, Has Consumption Inequality Mirrored Income Inequality? 
(Dec. 23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mirror_0.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2014); Orazio 
Attanasio et al., The Evolution of Income, Consumption, and Leisure Inequality in the U.S., 1980–2010 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper  No. 17982, 2012). 
6. Cf. Jeremy Arkes, Trends in Long-Run Versus Cross-Section Earnings Inequality in the 1970s 
and 1980s, 44 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 199 (1998) (finding Gini coefficient of five-year earnings to be 
lower than average Gini coefficient of annual earnings during the 1970s and 1980s). 
7. See infra Section I.C (describing structure of poverty metrics). 
8. Buhong Zheng, Aggregate Poverty Measures, 11 J. ECON. SURV. 123, 124 (1997). 
9. See Bruce D. Meyer & James X. Sullivan, Winning the War: Poverty from the Great Society to 
the Great Recession, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 133, 150–51 tbl.1 (2012). 
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yields a net decrease in the headcount ratio from 1980 to 2010; and, 
switching to consumption poverty, a larger decrease.10 
To be sure, it is deeply troubling (as a moral matter) and puzzling (as a 
matter of social science) that poverty in the United States has not decreased 
very substantially over the last thirty-five years, despite dramatic gains in 
GDP per capita.11 The point here is that poverty metrics are insensitive to 
distributional patterns above the poverty line. Thus, income inequality 
metrics, which are sensitive to such patterns, see a time trend of increasing 
inequity, while poverty metrics see a flat or perhaps somewhat downward 
trend. 
The picture becomes yet more muddled if we move away from 
indicators of economic well-being: income, wealth, consumption, wages. 
One such indicator is longevity. Peltzman examined the population 
distribution of lifespan in the United States, starting in the 1740s through 
2002. Using the Gini coefficient to measure the inequality of lifespan, he 
found a dramatic decrease—with continuing declines in lifespan inequality 
through the 1980s and 1990s.12 
The cumulative reduction of mortality inequality is startling. In the 
first century of our data, mortality Ginis range around 40 to 50. 
That is, they exceed the upper range of household income Ginis 
that prevail today in the developed world. The decline in mortality 
inequality since the mid nineteenth century is hardly interrupted by 
either of the two world wars . . . . This decline has taken the 
mortality Ginis of today down to levels that are much lower than—
on the order of half—the lowest contemporary income Ginis in 
these countries.13 
Edwards and Tuljapurkar reach broadly similar conclusions, using a 
variance-based measure of lifespan inequality.14 
A different indicator of individual well-being is happiness, as 
determined by surveys asking individuals, “How happy are you on a scale 
of 1 to 5?” or some similar question. Looking at the variance in the 
population-wide distribution of answers to these happiness surveys, 
Stevenson and Wolfers find that “happiness inequality fell sharply during 
 
10. Id. For earlier studies—using alternative measures and finding oscillating poverty over the 
decades after 1980—see KEVIN LANG, POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 87 fig.4.5 (2007); Thesia I. 
Garner & Kathleen S. Short, Identifying the Poor: Poverty Measurement for the U.S. from 1996 to 
2005, 56 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 237, 252 fig.2 (2010). 
11. See LANG, supra note 10, at 89 fig.4.6. 
12. Sam Peltzman, Mortality Inequality, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 175 (2009). 
13. Id. at 181. 
14. See Ryan D. Edwards & Shripad Tuljapurkar, Inequality in Life Spans and a New Perspective 
on Mortality Convergence Across Industrialized Countries, 31 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 645 (2005). 
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the 1970s and continued to fall in the 1980s, before rising slightly in the 
1990s and 2000s.”15 
While inequality metrics look at the population-wide distribution of 
some attribute (income, wealth, happiness, longevity, wages, etc.), and 
poverty metrics focus on the poverty-line-truncated distribution, yet a 
third—quite prevalent—approach examines disparities between socially 
salient groups.16 Call this the “social gradient” approach. Much work in this 
vein, particularly in the United States, looks at racial disparities. How 
serious are racial skews in income, wealth, longevity, educational 
attainment, etc.? A different strand in social-gradient work looks at 
socioeconomic differences, in particular at the correlation between 
socioeconomic status and some non-economic indicator (often, health).17 
Thus, the question, “Has the United States become a less equitable 
society?” can be construed in social-gradient terms—more specifically, in 
racial-disparity terms. Have racial disparities in economic or non-economic 
indicators increased or decreased since the 1970s? The answer to that 
question is complex. A recent study of racial disparities in health looked at 
black–white differentials with respect to 15 health measures over the period 
1990 to 2005, finding that disparities narrowed for 7 of the 15, and 
increased for 5.18 As for income, it is unclear whether the decline in racial 
disparities in income that occurred prior to 198019 has continued since then. 
Black–white wage differentials seem to have increased over the period 
 
15. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Happiness Inequality in the United States, 37(2) J. 
LEGAL STUD. S33, S51 (2008). See also Andrew E. Clark et al., The Great Happiness Moderation  37 
tbl.4.D (IZA Discussion Paper No. 6761) (2012). Dutta and Foster, using ordinal inequality indices, 
reach the following conclusion: “In terms of broad trends, happiness inequality [in the U.S.] decreased 
from its highest level in the 1970s, through the 1980s and 1990s. Only in the 2000s did it start to rise 
again. However, in 2010 there has been a remarkable decline in inequality . . . .”  Indranil Dutta & 
James Foster, Inequality of Happiness in the U.S.: 1972–2010, 59 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 393, 413 
(2013). 
16. See infra Section I.D. 
17. See generally C.J.L. Murray et al., Health Inequalities and Social Group Differences: What 
Should We Measure?, 77 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 537, 538 (1999). 
18. Jennifer M. Orsi et al., Black–White Health Disparities in the United States and Chicago: A 
15-Year Progress Analysis, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 349, 351–352 (2010). More precisely, statistically 
significant improvements were observed with respect to 7 measures (all-cause mortality, cancer 
mortality, lung cancer mortality, motor vehicle crash mortality, percentage low birth weight babies, 
percentage no prenatal cancer in the first trimester, and primary and secondary syphilis case rate); and 
statistically significant widenings were observed with respect to 5 (heart disease mortality, female 
breast cancer mortality, diabetes mortality, suicide mortality, and tuberculosis case rate). 
Using data on self-rated health from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Rohde and Guest find a 
reduction in black–white health inequality from 1990 through 2007. Nicholas Rohde & Ross Guest, 
Multidimensional Racial Inequality in the United States, 114 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 591, 597–599 
(2013). 
19. See T. Kirk White, Initial Conditions at Emancipation: The Long-Run Effect on Black–White 
Wealth and Earnings Inequality, 31 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 3370 (2007). 
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1980 to 2007.20 Finally, Stevenson and Wolfers observe a large decrease in 
the black–white disparity in happiness.21 
In short, different generic approaches to measuring equity, and 
different choices of the relevant attribute (income, health, happiness, etc.), 
can yield strikingly different stories about the direction and magnitude of 
the change in inequity in the United States over the last thirty-five years. 
And the same would be true if we shifted our focus to global inequity,22 or 
to a different time period.23 
This observation—I should stress—is not meant to downgrade the 
significance of the increase in U.S. income inequality. A high level of 
income inequality distorts the democratic process,24 and may well cause 
other sorts of inequities.25 Every citizen should be deeply concerned that 
the top 10% of the income distribution captures almost one half of the total, 
and that the top 1% captures one-fifth—returning us to disparities not seen 
in the United States since the 1920s.26 Income inequality is not merely 
intrinsically relevant—as one way of capturing inequity—but has a wide 
range of causal impacts. The focus of this Article is the measurement of 
inequity, not the (much larger) question of assessing the causal impacts of 
income inequality or other kinds of inequities. The reader should certainly 
be alive to that question, even though it is not one that I will be addressing 
here. 
In any event, what I have illustrated to this point—using a mini-case-
study of time trends in the United States over the last thirty-five years—is 
that equity can be quantified (e.g., via inequality, poverty, or social-
gradient metrics), but that the choice of metric can greatly affect the 
analyst’s conclusions (here, about the time trend). Of course, this is not 
 
20. Jake Rosenfeld & Meredith Kleykamp, Organized Labor and Racial Wage Inequality in the 
United States, 117 AM. J. SOC. 1460, 1468 (2012). 
21. See Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 15, at S61 fig.6. Yang also finds a shrinking of the 
black–white happiness gap (albeit more modest than that observed by Stevenson and Wolfers) in Social 
Inequalities in Happiness in the United States, 1972 to 2004: An Age–Period–Cohort Analysis, 73 AM. 
SOC. REV. 204 (2008); and Long and Happy Living: Trends and Patterns of Happy Life Expectancy in 
the U.S., 1970–2000, 37 SOC. SCI. RES. 1235 (2008). 
22. See Koen Decancq et al., The Evolution of World Inequality in Well-Being, 37 WORLD DEV. 
11 (2009); Mark McGillivray & Nora Markova, Global Inequality in Well-Being Dimensions, 46 J. 
DEV. STUD. 371 (2010). 
23. See Clayne Pope, Measuring the Distribution of Material Well-Being: U.S. Trends, 56 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 66 (2009) (finding divergent long-term trends with respect to income versus non-
income inequality). 
24. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY (2008). 
25. Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have documented many correlations between income 
inequality and social ills. See RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL (2009). Some 
of these correlations surely reflect a causal linkage from income inequality to the correlated item—
although teasing apart mere correlation and causation is not easy. 
26. PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 291–300 figs.8.5, 8.6, 8.7 & 8.8. 
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really surprising. What is less obvious is the deep connection among equity 
metrics that I asserted at the beginning of this Introduction. 
The central claim of this Article is that the Pigou-Dalton principle 
constitutes that deep connection. The Pigou-Dalton principle both unifies 
equity metrics, and differentiates them insofar as different metrics adopt 
divergent specifications of the principle. The Pigou-Dalton principle is the 
linchpin of equity, just as the Pareto principle is the linchpin of efficiency.27 
So, first, the Article aims to popularize Pigou-Dalton. How many law 
professors have never heard of the Pareto principle? How many are 
familiar with Pigou-Dalton? And yet any law professor (or economist or 
scholar of public health or . . . . ) who cares about equity ought to know 
what the principle says. 
 
So what it says is: 
 
The Pigou-Dalton Principle 
Assume that, in scenario x, one person has more of valuable 
attribute C than a second person. In scenario y, the first person’s 
level of C has decreased by some amount, and the second person’s 
level of C has increased by the very same amount. In other words, a 
“pure” (non-leaky) transfer of the attribute from the first person to 
the second has occurred. However, this transfer is not so large as to 
reverse their positions: in scenario y, the first person still has more 
C or an equal amount of C as the second person. Finally, these are 
the only two individuals affected (with respect to C) by the move 
from x to y. Everyone else’s  level of C in x is the same as her level 
of C in y.28 
Under these conditions, scenario y is more equitable than scenario 
x. We have reduced the gap between the first person’s holdings of 
C and the second’s, and have done so via a pure transfer—so that 
 
27. The principle can be traced to the work of A.C. Pigou and Hugh Dalton, and in the various 
literatures on equity discussed below it is regularly given the name “Pigou-Dalton” (but not always, 
sometimes instead being labeled, e.g., as the “principle of transfers”). See A.C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND 
WELFARE 24 (1912); Hugh Dalton, The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes, 30 ECON. J. 348, 
351 (1920). 
28. Sometimes, the principle is formulated more broadly—allowing for a transfer that does 
reverse the two individuals’ positions, but diminishes the difference in their holdings of C. It is more 
straightforward, I believe, to provide a direct normative “story” for the narrower principle. See 
MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 339–
40 (2012); infra Part II. However, if the currency C is well-being or some good proxy for well-being, 
the two principles are equally normatively attractive, since the broader principle follows from the 
narrower one given an axiom of “anonymity”: requiring that distributions of C which are the same 
except for who receives various amounts be seen as equally equitable. If C is well-being (at least), the 
anonymity axiom seems very powerful. See ADLER, supra, at 52. 
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the first person cannot complain, as a matter of equity, about the 
disparity between his loss and the other individual’s gain. 
While its cousin, Pareto, comes “pre-specified” in terms of preference-
satisfaction, the Pigou-Dalton principle is unspecified. For what is the 
valuable item C? Is it income? Utility? Happiness? Health? 
Part I of the Article will show how the Pigou-Dalton principle, in some 
form, underlies a wide range of equity metrics. I focus here on four families 
of metrics, each the basis for much current scholarship as well as 
information gathering by official statistical bureaus. Those families are 
inequality metrics, poverty metrics, social-gradient metrics, and social 
welfare functions. My survey of these tools will describe both traditional 
approaches and newer, innovative techniques within the four families—
namely, so-called “multidimensional” poverty and inequality metrics, 
inspired by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s work on “capabilities.” 
Part I will explain how each of the four kinds of metrics satisfies the Pigou-
Dalton principle in terms of some “currency”: some specification of the 
valuable attribute C. 
Part II will explore the normative defensibility of the Pigou-Dalton 
principle. Why does so much current thinking about equity presuppose that 
principle? I offer one possible justification for the principle: a justification 
which is “welfarist” in focusing on the connection between Pigou-Dalton 
transfers and well-being and presupposing the possibility of interpersonal 
well-being comparisons. Although alternative defenses of the principle are 
certainly possible, it is the welfarist approach that I believe most 
convincing, and present in Part II. 
Part III and Part IV explore difficult questions about the specification 
of the principle. Two key questions emerge from the survey of the four 
families in Part I. First, what is the appropriate “currency” for the Pigou-
Dalton principle? Second, should the principle be applied in a restricted 
form? As we shall see, both poverty metrics and social-gradient metrics—
in their own ways—limit the scope of the Pigou-Dalton principle. Poverty 
metrics do not satisfy the principle with respect to transfers above the 
poverty line, and social-gradient metrics only satisfy it for transfers from 
higher to lower social status individuals. 
Plausibly, the best defense of the social-class-restricted version of the 
Pigou-Dalton principle relates to considerations of individual 
responsibility. If Nadja is responsible for being worse off than Juan—if she 
has frittered away her resources, while Juan has been prudent—then equity 
no longer favors an improvement in her holdings at Juan’s expense. Now 
imagine that Nadja is worse off than Juan because of her lower social 
status. Surely that is not her responsibility. By restricting the Pigou-Dalton 
principle to transfers from higher- to lower-social-status individuals, social-
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gradient metrics work to ensure that considerations of individual 
responsibility do not vitiate the normative case for a transfer. 
However, this defense of social-gradient metrics may be challenged. 
Social class is a crude indicator of individual responsibility. The differing 
statuses of Nadja and Juan may not, in fact, have been the cause of their 
differential holdings of C. Moreover, Robert may have the same social 
status as Juan, yet have less C without being responsible for this 
differential. Shouldn’t the problem of responsibility be handled in a more 
systematic way? 
This question sets the stage for Part V, which explores an emerging, 
fifth family of equity metrics: responsibility-sensitive metrics (sometimes 
termed “equality-of-opportunity” metrics). Such metrics seek to demarcate 
between an individual’s “circumstances” (for which she is not accountable) 
and her “effort,” and to wash out differential effort in the measurement of 
inequality. This is an exciting, new development in the measurement of 
equity—and here, too, the Pigou-Dalton principle can be seen as 
foundational. Responsibility-sensitive metrics satisfy the principle after 
some kind of normalization for individual “effort.” For example, one such 
metric, proposed by John Roemer—a pioneering figure in this field—
favors Pigou-Dalton transfers from someone who has more of the 
appropriate “currency” to someone who has less, if they fall in the same 
“effort” class. 
This Article has three aims: descriptive, explanatory, and normative. 
First, I hope to describe a variety of methodologies, each widely utilized, 
for quantifying equity. Many readers will not be familiar with all or even 
any of these methodologies. Second, I aim to shine a light on the Pigou-
Dalton principle, showing how that fundamental axiom of equity both 
unites the methodologies, and yet also differentiates them insofar as the 
methodologies choose to specify the principle in different ways. Finally, I 
hope to excavate the normative debates underlying such differences in 
specification. What is the best way to measure equity? This is a pretty 
tough question to answer, but at least we can be clear about why it is so 
hard. 
I.  EQUITY METRICS: AN OVERVIEW 
This Part describes four families of equity metrics, stressing how each 
family—in its own way—is connected to the Pigou-Dalton principle. These 
families, between them, comprise the overwhelming bulk of contemporary 
scholarly work attempting to provide some kind of quantitative assessment 
of equity. 
 Throughout the Article, I will speak of a “Pigou-Dalton transfer” 
occurring with respect to some particular “currency”—income, utility, 
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happiness, etc.—and an equity metric satisfying the “Pigou-Dalton 
principle” with respect to some currency. A Pigou-Dalton transfer, with 
respect to a given currency, means a non-leaky transfer of the currency 
from someone who has more to someone who has less, still leaving the first 
person with a greater than or equal amount of the currency and changing no 
one else’s holdings of it. A given metric satisfies the Pigou-Dalton 
principle with respect to a given currency, if it necessarily counts a Pigou-
Dalton transfer in that currency as reducing the degree of inequity. 
A. Inequality Metrics 
Traditional measures of inequality are unidimensional. They focus on 
the distribution of some single attribute in a population. The most popular 
unidimensional inequality measures are the Gini coefficient; variance-
based measures, such as the coefficient of variation; the Theil index; and 
the Atkinson index.29 
For the most part, unidimensional inequality metrics have been used by 
scholars to study the distribution of income (or some other economic 
“currency,” such as wages, wealth, or consumption). But nothing in the 
formal structure of such metrics requires that income, or another economic 
attribute, be the input. All that is required is (1) information sufficient to 
estimate the distribution of the attribute in the population of interest (and 
the distribution’s intertemporal path, if time trends in inequality are being 
quantified), and (2) some cardinal scale for measuring the attribute.30 
Thus, a burgeoning body of work looks at the inequality of longevity or 
some cardinal measure of health.31 And if the researcher is comfortable 
 
29. For overviews of the theory of unidimensional inequality metrics, see HILDE BOJER, 
DISTRIBUTIONAL JUSTICE: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 63–133 (2003); SATYA R. CHAKRAVARTY, 
INEQUALITY, POLARIZATION, AND POVERTY ch. 1 (2009); FRANK A. COWELL, MEASURING 
INEQUALITY (3d ed., 2011); PETER J. LAMBERT, THE DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME  
1–132 (3d ed., 2001); Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert & David Donaldson, Income Inequality 
Measurement: The Normative Approach, in HANDBOOK ON INCOME INEQUALITY MEASUREMENT 133 
(Jacques Silber ed., 1999); Frank Cowell, Measurement of Inequality, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION 87 (Anthony Atkinson & Francois Bourguignon eds., 2000); Frank Cowell, Inequality 
and Poverty Measures, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D. 
Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); Bhaskar Dutta, Inequality, Poverty and Welfare, in 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 597 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 2002). 
30. By “cardinal,” here, I mean that the attribute is measurable on a scale which is finer than an 
ordinal scale—a scale that captures more than the levels of the attributes, e.g., differences between the 
levels, or ratios. Standard income inequality metrics assume either that income is measurable up to ratio 
rescalings, or up to a common translation factor. See CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, at 15–22; 
Blackorby, Bossert & Donaldson, supra note 29, at 144–51. 
  Some recent scholarship attempts to devise inequality metrics for attributes measured on an 
ordinal scale. See Dutta & Foster, supra note 15; Frank A. Cowell & Emmanuel Flachaire, Inequality 
with Ordinal Data (London Sch. of Econ., 2014), available at http://darp.lse.ac.uk/pdf/IneqOrdinal.pdf. 
31. See, e.g., ANGUS S. DEATON & CHRISTINA H. PAXSON, Aging and Inequality in Income and 
Health, 88 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & Proc.) 248 (1998); Edwards & Tuljapurkar, supra note 14; Neal 
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converting answers to a happiness survey to a cardinal scale, then the 
“currency” for the Gini coefficient, etc., can be happiness.32 
The so-called “Lorenz curve” is the conceptual foundation for 
unidimensional inequality metrics. (See Figure 1.) Consider, to begin, two 
populations with the same population size and same average individual 
level of the attribute (for example, the same average income), but different 
distributions. The Lorenz curve of a given distribution arranges individuals 
in rank order, from those who have the least amount of the attribute, to 
those who have the most. For each group of individuals along this spectrum 
(the lowest-ranked individual, the lowest- and second-lowest ranked 
individuals, the three lowest-ranked individuals, etc.), the group’s 
percentage of the total number of individuals in the entire population is 
mapped onto their share of the total amount of the attribute in the 
population. For example, if the first 5% of the population earns 1% of total 
income, and the first 10% earns 3% of total income, the Lorenz curve 
would include the points (5%, 1%) and (10%, 3%). 
The axiom of “Lorenz dominance” says that if the Lorenz curve for one 
distribution is sometimes inside the Lorenz curve for a second, and never 
outside, then an inequality metric should assign the first distribution a 
lower inequality number (degree of inequality).33 Lorenz dominance is 
generally seen as the most fundamental axiom that an inequality metric 
should satisfy, and indeed the standard metrics do satisfy it.34 The axiom of 
Lorenz dominance is very intuitive: if one distribution Lorenz-dominates a 
second, then—in a very clear and intuitive sense—it is “closer” to perfect 
equality than the second. Where standard inequality metrics differ is in how 
 
Fann et. al., Maximizing Health Benefits and Minimizing Inequality: Incorporating Local-Scale Data in 
the Design and Evaluation of Air Quality Policies, 31 RISK ANAL. 908 (2011); Mark McGillivray et. 
al., Health Inequality and Deprivation, 18 HEALTH ECON. (Supplement) S1 (2009); Peltzman, supra 
note 12; Pope, supra note 23; David E. Sahn & Stephen D. Younger, Measuring Intra-Household 
Health Inequality: Explorations Using the Body Mass Index, 18 HEALTH ECON. (Supplement) S13 
(2009). 
32. See sources cited supra note 21. 
33. Let (π, L(π)) be the Lorenz curve for one distribution, where π is the fraction of the total 
population in a given group of rank-ordered individuals, and L(π) their fraction of the total population 
holdings of the attribute. Let (π, L*(π)) be the Lorenz curve for a second distribution. Then this second 
curve Lorenz-dominates the first if L*(π) ≥ L(π) for all π, with this inequality strict for some. 
34. Note that a perfectly equal distribution of the attribute will Lorenz-dominate every other 
distribution. 
Recall that we are focusing here on two distributions with the same population size and the same mean. 
In that case all standard inequality metrics satisfy the axiom of Lorenz dominance. In a more general 
case, we might draw Lorenz curves for two distributions with the same population sizes but different 
means. In this case, so-called relative inequality metrics (those that assign the same degree of inequality 
to a distribution and all ratio rescalings) will continue to satisfy Lorenz dominance, but other kinds of 
inequality metrics need not.. The most widely-used inequality metrics—the coefficient of variation, 
Gini, Atkinson, and Theil—are relative metrics. See CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, ch. 1 (discussing 
relative and absolute metrics); COWELL, supra note 29, at 61–74 (discussing relative metrics under 
heading of “income scale independence”). 
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be reached from the second by a series of Pigou-Dalton transfers (plus 
perhaps a permutation).35 
For example, imagine that there are four individuals in the population, 
and that they begin with the unequal distribution (70, 95, 110, 125), where 
70 is the amount of the attribute held by Individual 1 (e.g., $70,000 in 
annual income if the attribute is income), 95 the amount of the attribute 
held by Individual 2, etc. The sum total of the attribute is 400. This 
distribution corresponds to a Lorenz curve whereby the first 25% of the 
population has 70/400 of the total attribute, the first 50% has 165/400 of 
the total, and the first 75% has 275/400 of the total. 
That distribution is (of course) Lorenz-dominated by a perfectly equal 
distribution (100, 100, 100, 100). The starting point (70, 95, 110, 125) can 
be turned into perfect equality via the following series of Pigou-Dalton 
transfers: from the starting point to (70, 100, 105, 125), to (75, 100, 100, 
125), to (100, 100, 100, 100).36 
The distribution is also Lorenz-dominated by the unequal distribution 
(75, 92, 113, 120)—a distribution “closer” to perfect equality. Why? Note 
that in this second distribution the first 25% of the population has 75/400 of 
the total (a greater percentage than 70/400); the first 50% of the population 
has 167/400 (which exceeds 165/400); and the first 75% has 280/400 
(which exceeds 275/400). Moreover, the Lorenz-dominating distribution 
(75, 92, 113, 120) can be reached from the starting point (70, 95, 110, 125) 
via the following series of Pigou-Dalton transfers: from the starting point to 
(75, 90, 110, 125), to (75, 90, 115, 120), to (75, 92, 113, 120). The “magic” 
of the Pigou-Dalton transfer, as proved by Hardy, Littlewood and Polya, is 
that this will be true for every case in which one distribution (perfectly 
equal or not) Lorenz-dominates a second. 
I have focused thus far on the inequality ranking of two distributions 
with the same population size and mean. Unidimensional inequality metrics 
 
35. See GODFREY H. HARDY, JOHN E. LITTLEWOOD & GEORGE POLYA, INEQUALITIES (1934); 
ALBERT W. MARSHALL & INGRAM OLKIN, INEQUALITIES: THEORY OF MAJORIZATION AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS 21–22 (Richard Bellman, ed.) (1979) (reproducing the Hardy/Littlewood/Polya 
theorem). Although the theorem is formulated in terms of Pigou-Dalton transfers in the broader sense of 
gap-diminishing transfers, see supra note 28, the proof strategy also shows that: one distribution is 
Lorenz-dominated by a second if and only if there is a series of Pigou-Dalton transfers in the narrower 
sense discussed in this Article (non-rank-switching transfers), combined perhaps with a permutation of 
individuals’ holdings, that leads from the first distribution to the second. To see why a permutation may 
be needed, consider the distribution among two individuals (30, 70), with 30 the holdings of the first 
individual, and the distribution (60, 40). The second distribution Lorenz-dominates the first, and can be 
generated from the first by a Pigou-Dalton transfer of 10, yielding (40, 60); and then a permutation to 
yield (60, 40). Clearly a Pigou-Dalton transfer in the narrower sense alone will never get us from (30, 
70) to (60, 40). 
36. The second distribution is reached from the starting point via a Pigou-Dalton transfer of 5 
from the third individual to the second; the third distribution from the second via a Pigou-Dalton 
transfer of 5 from the third individual to the first; and the perfectly equal distribution from the third 
distribution via a Pigou-Dalton transfer of 25 from the fourth individual to the first. 
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can be (and often are) employed to compare distributions with different 
means, population sizes, or both. In such a case, the Pigou-Dalton principle 
does not directly constrain inequality measurement.37 However, it shapes 
such assessment indirectly, if quantification is undertaken using a metric 
(Gini, coefficient of variation, Theil, etc.) that is sure to respect the Pigou-
Dalton principle in every case where the principle does apply. 
Multidimensional inequality metrics have recently become popular.38 
This development coincides with theoretical and empirical work on 
“capabilities” and “functionings.”39 A key theme in the capabilities/ 
functionings literature is the multiplicity of determinants of individual well-
being. An individual’s welfare cannot be reduced to her income, her health, 
her social and professional life, or the quality of her leisure, etc., but 
depends upon all of these, and more. 
One response to this (undeniably true) proposition about well-being is 
to construct some inclusive measure of individual well-being that integrates 
information about each individual’s multidimensional attainments, and then 
to use this all-things-considered number as the “currency” for a 
unidimensional inequality metric or social welfare function.40 
But multidimensional inequality metrics do not take this path. Instead, 
two other routes are pursued:  
a) Dimension-by-dimension assessment. The simplest approach is to 
apply a unidimensional inequality metric to each of the several 
dimensions about which the researcher has distributional data; and 
then take an average (or some similar function41) of these 
dimensional numbers. For example, if there is data about the 
distribution of income, health, and educational attainment (each 
 
37. If there has been a pure transfer, without any other change, then necessarily neither the 
population nor the mean level of the attribute has changed. 
38. See CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, ch.5 ; Asis Kumar Banerjee, A Multidimensional Gini 
Index, 60 MATHEMATICAL SOC. SCI. 87 (2010); Satya R. Chakravarty & Maria Ana Lugo, 
Multidimensional Indicators, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew 
D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); Jean-Yves Duclos et al., Partial Multidimensional 
Inequality Orderings, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 225 (2011); Esfandiar Maasoumi, Multidimensioned 
Approaches to Welfare Analysis, in HANDBOOK ON INCOME INEQUALITY MEASUREMENT 437 (Jacques 
Silber ed., 1999); Ernesto Savaglio, Three Approaches to the Analysis of Multidimensional Inequality, 
in INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 269 (Francesco Farina & Ernesto Savaglio eds., 2006); 
John Weymark, The Normative Approach to the Measurement of Multidimensional Inequality, in 
INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra, at 303. 
39. See, e.g., SABINA ALKIRE, VALUING FREEDOMS (2002); WIEBKE KUKLYS, AMARTYA SEN’S 
CAPABILITY APPROACH (2005); THE CAPABILITY APPROACH: CONCEPTS, MEASURES AND 
APPLICATIONS (Flavio Comim et al. eds, 2008); Ingrid Robeyns, The Capability Approach: A 
Theoretical Survey, 6 J. HUM. DEVELOPMENT 93 (2005). The field is inspired by Martha Nussbaum’s 
and Amartya Sen’s scholarship. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: 
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992). 
40. See ADLER, supra note 28, at 119–24. 
41. By “similar,” here, I mean that the overall inequality assigned to a multidimensional 
distribution is monotonically increasing in inequality in each of the dimensions. 
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cardinally measured), we might estimate multidimensional 
inequality as the average of the Gini coefficient of income, health, 
and educational attainment.  
b)  “Sophisticated” multidimensional inequality metrics. The 
dimension-by-dimension format has various deficits. In particular, 
it ignores interdimensional correlations. (Imagine that two 
populations have the very same distributions of income, health, and 
educational attainment—taken separately—but in the first case 
those with higher incomes tend to have better health and education, 
while in the second case there are no systematic connections 
between an individual’s health, income, and education. Then, 
surely, the second distribution is more equitable.)  
“Sophisticated”42 multidimensional metrics are (mathematically 
complicated) formulas for assigning an inequality number to a 
multidimensional distribution—formulas which are not merely an 
average or some other function of the inequality in each dimension 
taken separately. 
How do multidimensional inequality tools link up with the Pigou-
Dalton principle? For the dimension-by-dimension approach, the answer is 
straightforward. A Pigou-Dalton transfer in any dimension will decrease 
the degree of inequality in that dimension and thus will decrease the 
average of dimension-specific inequality.43 For “sophisticated” 
multidimensional metrics, the answer is more complex. Such metrics 
typically satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle with respect to coordinated 
transfers, which (depending on the metric) can mean either that (1) a 
bundle of Pigou-Dalton transfers between two individuals, in each and 
every dimension, reduces the degree of inequality assigned to a 
multidimensional distribution;44 or that (2) a Pigou-Dalton transfer in at 
least one dimension, from an individual who is at a higher level in all 
 
42. “Sophisticated” is not a standard term in the literature, but rather one that I use here to mean 
any approach to measuring multidimensional inequality other than dimension-by-dimension 
assessment. Such an approach is “sophisticated” in the sense that it can take account of 
interdimensional correlations. 
43. It will also decrease the value of any other function monotonically increasing in dimension-
specific inequality, see supra note 41. 
44. More precisely, a standard multidimensional Pigou-Dalton principle says that a bundle of 
equiproportional dimension-specific Pigou-Dalton transfers between two individuals—equiproportional 
in the sense that the distance between the individuals on each dimension is reduced by the same 
fraction—decreases multidimensional inequality. See Weymark, supra note 38, at 307; ADLER, supra 
note 28, at 131 n.140. The literature on multidimensional metrics also discusses a “majorization” 
axiom, requiring inequality to decrease if a multidimensional distribution is multiplied by a bistochastic 
matrix. An inequality metric which satisfies this majorization axiom will also satisfy the 
equiproportional Pigou-Dalton principle just mentioned. See Weymark, supra, at 308. 
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dimensions, to an individual at a lower level in all dimensions, reduces the 
assigned degree of inequality.45 
B. Social Welfare Functions 
Social welfare functions (SWFs) are much discussed in theoretical 
welfare economics; are widely used in some fields of applied economics, 
particularly optimal tax scholarship; and provide the intellectual foundation 
for cost-benefit analysis with distributional weights. An SWF takes 
information about the population distribution of individual attainments (be 
it attainment on a single dimension, or on multiple dimensions), and uses a 
“utility” function to convert that information into a list of “utility” 
numbers—one for each individual. Distributions are then ranked on the 
basis of these utility numbers.46 
SWFs can assume various functional forms. One such form, the most 
famous, is utilitarian. The utilitarian SWF compares two distributions by 
summing utilities. The utilitarian SWF may respect the Pigou-Dalton 
principle with respect to income. This depends on how the translation of 
income into utility occurs. If this translation is non-linear, and in particular 
is such that income has “diminishing marginal utility,” the utilitarian SWF 
will satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle with respect to income. 
But the utilitarian SWF clearly does not respect the Pigou-Dalton 
principle “in the space of utility.” Assume that there are four individuals. In 
scenario x, the individuals have various attainments, translated into the list 
of utilities (30, 140, 70, 80). In scenario y, the attainments are different, so 
that the utilities become (60, 110, 70, 80). Thus, in scenario y, there has 
been a Pigou-Dalton transfer in utility (30 units) from Individual 2 to 
Individual 1. But the sum totals of utility are the same, and hence 
utilitarianism ranks the scenarios as equally good. 
However, there are important classes of SWFs that satisfy the Pigou-
Dalton principle in the space of utility (for short, “equity-regarding” 
SWFs). “Continuous prioritarian” SWFs47 sum utility numbers 
 
45. See Casilda Lasso de la Vega et al., Characterizing Multidimensional Inequality Measures 
Which Fulfill the Pigou-Dalton Bundle Principle, 35 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 319 (2010). On the 
Pigou-Dalton principle in the multidimensional context, see also sources cited supra note 38; Henar 
Diez et al., A Consistent Multidimensional Generalization of the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle: An 
Analysis, 7 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. art. 45 (2007); Kristof Bosmans et al., Note: A Consistent 
Multidimensional Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle, 144 J. ECON. THEORY 1358 (2009). 
46. By “utility,” I mean a measure of well-being that is both intra- and interpersonally 
comparable, and makes intrapersonal comparisons in conformity with individuals’ preferenes. See infra 
Part III.  For a comprehensive discussion of social welfare functions, see ADLER, supra note 28. On 
their functional forms, see id. ch. 5. For citations to scholarship on SWFs, see id. at 83 n.45, 87 n.56. 
For a recent survey, see John Weymark, Social Welfare Functions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-
BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015). 
47. See ADLER, supra note 28, at 356–58. 
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The Pigou-Dalton principle in the space of utility is also satisfied by 
other SWFs, such as the rank-weighted and leximin SWFs.48 Continuous 
prioritarian, leximin, and rank-weighted SWFs are the prime examples of 
equity-regarding SWFs.49 All three are structured (in somewhat different 
ways) to give greater weight to utility changes affecting individuals at 
lower utility levels, as compared to individuals at higher levels. 
What is the difference between ranking distributions using an 
inequality metric with utility as the currency, and ranking such distributions 
using an equity-regarding SWF? A critical difference is that the first 
technique ignores the sum total of utility. (For example, if everyone’s 
utility doubles, an inequality metric with utility as its currency will record 
no change,50 while an SWF will see an improvement.) Inequality metrics 
are only measures of inequality. Equity-regarding SWFs are hybrid 
measures, taking into account both information about total well-being (the 
sum total of utility) and information about the degree of equality of utility. 
However, the key point to stress here is the similarity between equity-
regarding SWFs and inequality metrics: namely, that both respect the 
Pigou-Dalton principle in some fashion. By contrast, with the utilitarian 
SWF—which does not respect the Pigou-Dalton principle in the space of 
utility, and does so in the space of income only if the translation from 
income to utility is such that income has diminishing marginal utility—an 
equity-regarding SWF always respects a Pigou-Dalton transfer in the space 
of utility.51 Note that, in the case of a non-leaky transfer in utility from a 
higher utility to a lower utility individual, total well-being is a “wash” and 
the equality of utility becomes the only consideration driving the equity-
regarding SWF. If, in addition, the transfer is a Pigou-Dalton transfer, 
shrinking the utility gap between the two individuals, the transfer reduces 
 
48. The leximin SWF ranks utility vectors according to the worst-off utilities; if these are equal, 
the second-worst-off; and so forth. See ADLER, supra note 28, at 367–74. It is obvious that this SWF 
satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle. The rank-weighted SWF orders utility numbers from lowest to 
highest, and sums these multiplied by fixed, decreasing weights. See id. at 351–56. The rank-weighted 
SWF can also be shown to satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle. See id. at 353. 
49. These are certainly not the only SWFs that respect the Pigou-Dalton principle. See, e.g., 
ADLER, supra note 28, at 374–77 (discussing prioritarian SWF with a lexical threshold). However, 
these are the three such SWFs that are by far the most widely used in scholarly work in the SWF 
tradition. 
50. Strictly speaking, this is true for relative inequality metrics, while absolute inequality metrics 
will be invariant to increases in overall well-being that occur by increasing everyone’s utility by the 
same amount. On the difference between such metrics, see CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, at 16. Either 
type of metric will assign the same value to utility vectors in which everyone’s utility is equal, 
regardless of the total. 
51. Note that, because SWFs take utility numbers (not attributes) as their inputs, an SWF can be 
structured to respect the Pigou-Dalton principle in the space of utility regardless of the mapping from 
individual attributes to utility levels—and this is true of the continuous prioritarian, rank-weighted, and 
leximin SWFs. 
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the inequality of utility and is preferred by the equity-regarding SWF, just 
as it would be by an inequality metric with utility as the currency. 
C. Poverty Metrics 
Traditionally, poverty measurement focused on income poverty (just as 
inequality metrics were first developed to measure income inequality). 
Formally, an income-poverty metric is a function of the distribution of 
individual incomes—with two critical differences from income-inequality 
measures.52 First, poverty measurement also depends on the identification 
of a poverty line. Various approaches are adopted here: the income-poverty 
line can be specified in an “absolute” fashion (as the amount of income 
required to meet minimum nutritional requirements or other basic needs); 
or a “relative” fashion (as some fraction of the mean or median income).53 
The poverty line permits the characterization of individuals as “poor” 
or not: a “poor” individual is someone whose income is below the line. But 
it also undergirds the so-called “focus” requirement: if Z is the poverty line, 
and distributions d and dʹ have the same pattern of incomes below Z, then 
the degree of poverty for the two distributions is the same.54 
Because of the focus requirement, the connection between poverty 
metrics and the Pigou-Dalton axiom is less straightforward than for 
inequality metrics. A logical consequence of the “focus” requirement is that 
above-threshold transfers have no effect on the degree of poverty. This is 
intuitive. Assume that distribution d is (10, 15, 30, 60, 100), while dʹ is (10, 
15, 50, 50, 90). The numbers represent annual incomes with five 
individuals in total and the poverty line is, let us assume, 25. Note that dʹ is 
reached from d via a series of two Pigou-Dalton transfers.55 Distribution dʹ 
therefore Lorenz-dominates d; and the Gini coefficient, Theil index, 
coefficient of variation, or any other standard inequality metric will assign 
a lower degree of inequality to dʹ than d. But every standard poverty metric 
(by virtue of the focus requirement) will say that the degree of poverty in d 
and dʹ is exactly the same. 
 
52. On income-poverty metrics, see CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, ch. 2; LAMBERT, supra note 
29, ch. 6; Dutta, supra note 29; Buhong Zheng, Aggregate Poverty Measures, 11 J. ECON. SURV. 123 
(1997). 
53. On the setting of poverty lines, see Martin Ravallion, Poverty Lines Across the World (World 
Bank Dev.Res. Grp., Working Paper No. 5284 April 2010). 
54. See CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, at 50; Zheng, supra note 52, at 130. Note that poverty 
metrics generally can compare two distributions, given the two, possibly different, poverty lines 
associated with each distribution—but that the focus axiom is expressed with reference to the case in 
which the same line is used for two distributions. 
55. First transfer 10 from the fifth individual to the third, then transfer 10 from the fourth to the 
third. 
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Still, the “focus” requirement is consistent with restricted versions of 
the Pigou-Dalton principle, such as the following56: 
(1) Below-Threshold Transfers: A Pigou-Dalton transfer 
between two poor individuals lowers the degree of poverty. 
(2) Across-Threshold Transfers (weak version): If one 
individual is poor, and a second non-poor,57 a Pigou-Dalton 
transfer between them that does not change their positions 
relative to the poverty line (i.e., does not change the number of 
poor and non-poor individuals) lowers the degree of poverty. 
(3) Across-Threshold Transfers (strong version): If one 
individual is poor, and a second non-poor, a Pigou-Dalton 
transfer between them lowers the degree of poverty even if it 
changes the number of poor individuals. 
In the theoretical literature on the measurement of income poverty, the 
first and second axioms are generally endorsed. The third is more 
controversial;58 consider a case in which a Pigou-Dalton transfer increases 
the number of poor individuals (i.e., the mean income of transferor and 
transferee is below the poverty line, and the transfer is sufficiently large to 
bring the transferor below that line). 
Whether the third axiom should be accepted depends on broader 
questions about the normative role of poverty measures, mooted below. 
The basic point, here, is that the “focused” structure of poverty measures 
precludes their satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle with respect to 
transfers above the poverty line—but, reciprocally, permits their satisfying 
restricted versions of the Pigou-Dalton principle (such as (1), (2), or (3)), 
applicable to a transfer that increases the income of someone who starts out 
below the poverty line. 
 
56. Statements of the Pigou-Dalton principle as a condition on poverty metrics, such as those 
immediately below, constrain the poverty measure of two distributions using a common poverty line. 
For a discussion of different versions of the Pigou-Dalton principle for poverty metrics, see sources 
cited supra note 52. See also Lucio Esposita & Peter J. Lambert, Poverty Measurement: 
Prioritarianism, Sufficiency and the ‘I’s of Poverty, 27 ECON. & PHIL 109 (2011); Buhong Zheng, 
Poverty Orderings, 14 J. ECON. SURVEYS 427 (2000). Zheng, supra note 52, is especially systematic. 
57. Strictly, a “non-poor” individual is someone whose income places her at or above the poverty 
line.  See Zheng, supra note 52 (noting that a “weak” definition of the poor avoids certain axiomatic 
difficulties that arise if individuals at the poverty line are counted as “poor”).  However, so as to 
simplify matters, my discussion of the non-poor is focused on the paradigmatic case of individuals 
whose holdings place them above the poverty line.  My claims generalize to “non-poor” individuals 
who are right at the poverty line.  Most fundamentally, note that regardless of whether the term “non-
poor” is used to include or exclude those right at the poverty line, poverty metrics are invariably 
“restricted” in the sense of ignoring Pigou-Dalton transfers among individuals above the poverty line. 
58. See CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, at 53; Zheng, supra note 52, at 133. 
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One of the most popular classes of poverty metrics in academic work is 
the FGT class.59 The FGT approach calculates each poor individual’s 
fractional shortfall from the poverty line (with others assigned a value of 
zero) and then averages these numbers raised to some power α. If this α 
parameter is greater than 1, the FGT approach satisfies all three of the 
above Pigou-Dalton axioms. 
Admittedly, some poverty metrics employed in empirical research (or 
by governmental statistical bureaus) go to the other extreme and fail to 
satisfy any one of these axioms. This is true, in particular, of the headcount 
ratio: the percentage of the population that is poor.60 But the headcount 
ratio is often criticized in theoretical work on poverty measurement 
(beginning with a seminal critique by Amartya Sen, in a 1976 article61) 
because it wholly ignores the distribution of income among poor 
individuals and thus is insensitive to transfers (be they from poor to poor or 
from rich to poor) that change this distribution but do not change the 
numbers of poor and non-poor. 
The recent rise of the “multidimensional” approach to inequality 
measurement is mirrored by similar work on poverty metrics—in both 
cases, fueled by a desire to move “beyond income” as an indicator of 
human well-being.62 Assume, now, that d is a multidimensional distribution 
 
59. See Udo Ebert & Patrick Moyes, A Simple Axiomatization of the Foster, Greer & Thorbecke 
Poverty Orderings, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 455 (2002); James Foster, Joel Greer, & Erik Thorbecke, 
The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) Poverty Measures: 25 Years Later, 8 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 491 
(2010). Let Z be the income poverty line, and yi the income of individual i or Z, whichever is smaller. 
With N individuals, the FGT index is: 
1
1 N i
i
Z y
N Z
α
=
−    .  
60. See Zheng, supra note 52, at 142–44. 
61. Amartya Sen, Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement, 2 ECONOMETRICA 219 (1976). 
See also AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 102–04 (1992). Sen notes in the latter work that 
“[t]he need for having distribution-sensitivity in measuring poverty [i.e., a sensitivity of the metric to 
the distribution of income among the poor] seems to be fairly widely accepted by now.” Id. at 106. 
62. See Sabina Alkire, Capabilities, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (Matthew D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, 
ch. 6; Satya Chakravarty and Maria Ana Lugo, Multidimensional Indicators, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); THE 
MANY DIMENSIONS OF POVERTY (Nanak Kakwani & Jacques Silber eds., 2007); QUANTITATIVE 
APPROACHES TO MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY MEASUREMENT (Nanak Kakwani & Jacques Silber 
eds., 2008); Sabina Alkire & James Foster, Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measurement, 96 J. 
PUB. ECON. 476 (2011) [hereinafter Alkire & Foster, Counting and Multidimensional Poverty 
Measurement]; Sabina Alkire & James Foster, Understandings and Misunderstandings of 
Multidimensional Poverty Measurement, 9 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 289 (2011) [hereinafter Alkire & 
Foster, Understandings and Misunderstandings]; Sabina Alkire & Maria Emma Santos, A 
Multidimensional Approach: Poverty Measurement & Beyond, 112 SOCIAL INDICATORS RES. 239 
(2013); A.B. Atkinson, Multidimensional Deprivation: Contrasting Social Welfare and Counting 
Approaches, 1 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 51 (2003); Francois Bourguignon & Satya R. Chakravarty, The 
Measurement of Multidimensional Poverty, 1 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 25 (2003); Jean-Yves Duclos et al., 
Robust Multidimensional Poverty Comparisons, 116 ECON. J. 943 (2006); Martin Ravallion, On 
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(describing individual attainments with respect to a multiplicity of welfare-
relevant attributes). A multidimensional poverty metric, like its inequality 
counterpart, will assign some number to this distribution—with the critical 
difference that this number depends not just on the pattern of individual 
attainments but also on the identification of dimension-specific thresholds. 
For example, if d describes individuals’ levels of the three attributes 
income, health, and education, then the researcher will need to specify a 
separate threshold (poverty line) for income, for health, and for 
education—e.g., a minimum level of income, health, and education, 
respectively, required for a decent human life. 
What is the structure of multidimensional poverty metrics? Here, as 
with multidimensional inequality measurement, one can differentiate 
between (1) dimension-by-dimension and (2) “sophisticated” approaches.63  
The dimension-by-dimension approach will employ some metric M 
traditionally employed to calculate income poverty (for example, the 
headcount ratio, the FGT metric, or any other); will apply it to each of the 
dimensions; and will then take an average (or some similar function)64 of 
these dimension-specific poverty values. If M would satisfy a restricted 
version of the Pigou-Dalton principle, when applied to income, then the 
dimension-by-dimension approach using M will satisfy the very same 
principle on an attribute-by-attribute basis. 
For example, assume that M, applied to an income distribution, 
satisfies the axiom of “below-threshold transfers”: a Pigou-Dalton transfer 
from one person with a below-threshold income to a second with an even 
lower income reduces the degree of poverty according to M. Now imagine 
that multidimensional distribution dʹ is reached from d by a transfer on any 
dimension from someone below the threshold for that dimension to 
someone even lower. Then the dimension-by-dimension approach using M 
will say that the degree of poverty is lower in dʹ than d. 
Research on “sophisticated” multidimensional poverty metrics is quite 
new, and it is hard to be sure about what will emerge. A leading contender 
seems to be the “Alkire-Foster” index of multidimensional poverty, which 
builds upon the FGT formula.65 Roughly speaking, Alkire and Foster 
propose to identify an individual as “poor” if she has below-threshold 
 
Multidimensional Indices of Poverty, 9 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 235 (2011); Kai-yuen Tsui, 
Multidimensional Poverty Indices, 19 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 69 (2002). 
63. See Alkire & Foster, Understandings and Misunderstandings, supra note 62, at 303–04 
(criticizing “marginal,” i.e., dimension-by-dimension approach because it “does not look across 
dimensions for the same person and cannot reflect the extent of associations among deprivations”). 
64. See supra note 41. 
65. See Alkire & Foster, Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measurement, supra note 62; 
Alkire & Foster, Understandings and Misunderstandings, supra note 62; Alkire & Santos, supra note 
62. 
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attainments in a sufficient number of dimensions.66 Poor individuals are 
assigned a deprivation value in each dimension, equaling their fractional 
shortfall from the dimension-specific line. Non-poor individuals are 
assigned a deprivation value of 0 in each dimension. These values, raised to 
the power α, are summed across individuals and dimensions. 
The Alkire-Foster formula differs from a dimension-by-dimension 
approach, because its identification of an individual as “poor” depends 
upon her attainments in all the dimensions, and this identification, in turn, 
helps determine the deprivation numbers assigned to each individual. Still, 
the approach satisfies a version of the Pigou-Dalton principle: a transfer on 
any dimension from one poor individual to a second reduces the degree of 
poverty.67 
D. Social-Gradient Metrics 
The social-gradient view of equity is adopted in much research on 
public health and in the literature on environmental justice.68 On this view, 
the population-wide distribution of income, health, utility, happiness, or 
any other attribute lacks normative relevance as such. Rather, what is 
relevant is the association between valuable or harmful attributes and 
markers of social status. As a leading researcher explains: “[E]quity in 
health can be defined as the absence of systematic disparities in 
health . . . between social groups who have different levels of underlying 
social advantage/disadvantage—that is, different positions in a social 
hierarchy.”69 Social status is proxied in a number of different ways. 
“Analytical traditions vary [on how to choose the proxy]: in the United 
Kingdom, social groups have been defined using five categories of 
occupation-based social class; in some countries in continental Europe, 
educational attainment or occupational categories have been used; and in 
 
66. Their approach to characterizing a person as “poor” also allows for differential weighting of 
dimensions. 
67. This assumes (as with the FGT metric for the unidimensional case) that α > 1. Note that a 
Pigou-Dalton transfer in one dimension to a person who is below the dimension-specific threshold, but 
is not “poor” (i.e., is not below the threshold on a sufficient number of dimensions), will not reduce the 
degree of poverty as per the Alkire-Foster metric. This is true regardless of where the individual ends 
up relative to the dimension-specific threshold, and of where the transferor starts out or ends up. 
By contrast, the dimension-by-dimension application of a unidimensional poverty metric that satisfies 
some version of the Pigou-Dalton principle will record such a transfer as reducing poverty, at least in 
some cases (depending on the positions of the transferee and transferor relative to the dimension-
specific threshold.). In particular, the dimension-by-dimension application of the FGT metric will 
always record such a transfer as reducing poverty. 
68. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk Equity: A New Proposal, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6–11 
(2008) (citing literature). 
69. Paula Braveman & Sofia Gruskin, Defining Equity in Health, 57 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. 
HEALTH 254, 254 (2003). 
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the USA, most research focuses on social categories defined in terms of 
racial groups.”70 
A variety of tools are employed to measure the association between 
social class and harms or benefits.71 Many such tools satisfy the Pigou-
Dalton principle in some form. In outlining this connection, I will focus on 
the “concentration index”—increasingly favored by researchers as one of 
the best social-gradient metrics because it integrates information about 
attainments in all social groups.72 
Imagine that the population is divided into G social groups, with Group 
1 at the bottom of the social hierarchy, Group 2 in the second-worst social 
position, etc. There is a distribution, d, which distributes some valuable 
attribute to the members of each of the G groups.73 The so-called 
“concentration curve” for this distribution is drawn as follows. For each 
group, in succession, we plot the percentage of the population belonging to 
that group and all lower status groups against the percentage of the total 
amount of the attribute held by those groups. For example, if there are three 
groups of low, middle, and high status, with respectively 20%, 70%, and 
10% of the population; and the total amount of the attribute held by each 
group is, respectively, 5, 45, and 50; then the concentration curve includes 
the points (0,0), (20%, 5%), (90%, 50%), and (100%, 100%). 
 The “concentration index” for a given distribution d, then, is twice 
the area between its concentration curve and the 45-degree line.74 The 
higher the value for this index, the more the attribute is “concentrated” in 
higher-status groups. See Figure 3. 
 
  
 
70. C.J.L. Murray et al., Health Inequalities and Social Group Differences: What Should We 
Measure?, 77 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 537, 538 (1999). 
71. For descriptions of many of these, see Paula Braveman, Health Disparities and Health 
Equity: Concepts and Measurement, 27 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 167, 172–79 (2006); Johann 
Mackenbach & Anton E. Kunst, Measuring the Magnitude of Socio-economic Inequalities in Health, 44 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 757 (1997); Adam Wagstaff et al., On the Measurement of Inequalities in Health, 33 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 545 (1991). 
72. See Nicolas Ziebarth, Measurement of Health, Health Inequality, and Reporting 
Heterogeneity, 71 SOC. SCI. MED. 116, 117 (2010) (noting that the concentration index is “by far the 
dominant health inequality indicator”). For descriptions of the index and its properties, see Philip 
Clarke & Tom Van Ourti, Calculating the Concentration Index when Income is Grouped, 29 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 151 (2010); Guido Erreygers, Correcting the Concentration Index, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 504 
(2009); Nanak Kakwani et al., Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health: Measurement, Computation, and 
Statistical Inference, 77 J. ECONOMETRICS 87 (1997). 
73. The concentration index is sometimes applied to bad attributes, e.g., ill health, but the 
analysis in this Article generally assumes that the currency for equity is a good attribute—be it income, 
utility, or the multiple goods that go into multidimensional inequality or poverty metrics. Thus, I focus 
here on the concentration index used to measure social skews in good attributes. 
74. It can range in value from 1 to −1, with lower value indicating less concentration of the 
attribute in higher status groups, i.e., greater equity. 
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Pigou Dalton Principle: Social Class Restricted 
Imagine that one individual has more of some valuable attribute 
than a second in distribution d, and that a Pigou-Dalton transfer of 
the attribute from the first to the second individual occurs, yielding 
dʹ. If the transferee has a worse position in the social hierarchy, 
then dʹ should be assigned a lower degree of inequity than d.75 
To see why the concentration index satisfies the social-class-restricted 
version of the Pigou-Dalton principle, observe that a Pigou-Dalton transfer 
of the attribute from a higher to a lower status individual will tend to 
“flatten” the concentration curve and bring it close to the diagonal. 
Conversely, if dʹ is reached from d via a Pigou-Dalton attribute transfer 
from someone with more of the attribute to someone who has less, but the 
transferor has the same or lower social status than the transferee, the 
concentration index will fail to see dʹ as more equitable than d. In other 
words, the concentration index fails to satisfy the more general version of 
the Pigou-Dalton principle, requiring any transfer to increase equity 
regardless of the social classes of the two individuals. Clearly, if the 
transferee and transferor are in the same group, the value of the 
concentration index does not change at all. And if we are transferring from 
a high attribute, low-status individual to a low attribute, high-status 
individual (for example, transferring income from a high-income, minority 
person to a low-income Caucasian in a society where race is the marker of 
social status), we will be tending to increase the concentration of the 
attribute in the higher status group. 
E. A Summary 
Several themes emerge from this survey of four widely-used families 
of equity metrics: inequality metrics, social welfare functions (SWFs), 
 
75. Let there be G groups with increasing social status, g = 1 to G, and N individuals, i = 1 to N, 
each falling in one of the groups. Let yi be the attribute level of individual i, and μ the population mean. 
Let fm be the fraction of the population in group m. Define Rg, the so-called “relative rank” 
corresponding to group g, as follows: Rg = 
f g
2
+ fmm=1
g−1 . For each individual i, let her relative rank 
Ri be the rank of the group she belongs to (lower status individuals will have lower such values). It can 
be shown that the concentration index is equal to: 
1
2
1
N
i ii
y R
Nμ =
−
    . 
This formula makes it apparent that a Pigou-Dalton transfer between two individuals will lower the 
value of the concentration index iff the transferee has a lower relative rank than the transferor, i.e., iff 
the transferee is lower social status. 
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poverty metrics, and social-gradient metrics. First, the “currency” for the 
Pigou-Dalton principle can vary. Income-inequality metrics and income-
poverty metrics, paradigmatically, satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle with 
respect to income (in the case of income-poverty metrics, a restricted 
version of the principle). Equity-regarding SWFs satisfy that principle with 
respect to utility. Unidimensional inequality metrics applied to some non-
income attribute (e.g., health or happiness) will satisfy the principle with 
respect to that attribute. Multi-attribute inequality or poverty metrics will 
satisfy the principle (perhaps in a coordinated and/or restricted form) with 
respect to transfers in each of the multiple dimensions of individual 
attainment being measured. 
Second, the Pigou-Dalton principle may be restricted to a subset of 
transfers. Poverty metrics will not satisfy the principle with respect to 
transfers between non-poor individuals (those above the poverty line). The 
concentration index, a paradigmatic social-gradient metric, does not satisfy 
the principle except for transfers from higher to lower social status 
individuals.  
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Table 1: Understanding Equity Metrics76 
 What is the Currency for the Pigou-Dalton Principle? 
Is the Principle Restricted 
in Scope? 
 
Inequality Metrics 
 
Unidimensional 
 
 
 
Multidimensional 
 
Simple 
 
 
 
Sophisticated 
 
 
 
 
Income or any other single attribute 
(health, happiness, utility, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
Each of a multiplicity of attributes 
(a transfer along any dimension 
improves equality) 
 
A transfer along one dimension, if 
appropriately coordinated with the 
other dimensions,  improves 
equality 
 
 
 
No: A Pigou-Dalton transfer 
is approved regardless of 
whether the transferee is non-
poor, of high social class, or 
responsible for being worse 
off than the transferor 
Equity-Regarding SWFs 
 
(most notably the continuous 
prioritarian, leximin and rank-
weighted SWFs) 
Utility (a measure of well-being 
that is both interpersonally 
comparable and respects individual 
preferences) 
No 
 
Poverty Metrics 
 
Unidimensional 
 
 
Multidimensional 
 
Simple 
 
 
 
Sophisticated 
 
 
 
 
Income or any other single attribute 
(health, happiness, utility, etc.) 
 
 
 
Each of a multiplicity of attributes 
(a transfer along any dimension 
reduces poverty) 
 
A transfer along one dimension, if 
appropriately coordinated with the 
other dimensions, reduces poverty 
 
 
 
Yes: Transfers to individuals 
who are above the poverty 
line (or “non-poor” in a more 
complicated sense for 
sophisticated 
multidimensional metrics) do 
not reduce poverty 
 
76. Note that the table entry for “sophisticated” multidimensional inequality metrics requires 
appropriate “coordination” among the transfers.  As discussed earlier, the versions of the Pigou-Dalton 
principle discussed in the literature on multidimensional inequality build in this “coordination” 
requirement in various ways. One such requirement requires equiproportional transfers on all 
dimensions; another, that the transferor be better off in all dimensions. See supra text accompanying 
notes 44–45. 
Similarly, the table entry for “sophisticated” multidimensional poverty metrics has a coordination 
requirement. Here, recall that the Alkire-Foster metric (currently the leading multidimensional poverty 
metric) incorporates such a requirement because it doesn’t record a dimension-specific transfer as 
reducing poverty if the transferee is above a sufficient number of thresholds in the other dimensions. 
See sources cited supra note 65. 
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Social Gradient Metrics 
 
(The analysis focuses on the 
concentration index, the best-
developed social-gradient metric.) 
 
Income or any other single attribute 
(health, happiness, utility, etc.) 
Yes: Transfers improve 
equity only if the transferee is 
in a lower-status social group 
than the transferor 
 
These divergent choices with respect to the specification of the Pigou-
Dalton principle help to explain the diversity of these metrics—to explain 
why their mathematical expression varies, and why they can disagree in 
their comparisons of situations as more or less equitable. To be sure, 
divergence in the specification of the Pigou-Dalton principle is not the only 
important difference between these metrics. (For example, the Gini 
coefficient and the coefficient of variation, applied to compare income 
distributions, will each satisfy the unrestricted Pigou-Dalton principle with 
income as its currency—and yet these metrics are still distinct, namely in 
how they rank two income distributions with crossing Lorenz curves.) Still, 
I think we make substantial progress in understanding the “topography” of 
equity metrics by seeing that the four popular families I have described all 
embrace the Pigou-Dalton principle in some form, with disagreement about 
what that form should be.77 
II. WHY THE PIGOU-DALTON PRINCIPLE? A GENERIC JUSTIFICATION 
The Pigou-Dalton principle, evidently, is pervasive in the measurement 
of equity. But can this pervasive role be justified? Why, as a normative 
matter, should we endorse it? 
Here I offer a general argument for the Pigou-Dalton principle—an 
argument encapsulated in the form of a “Generic Justification” for the 
principle, stating conditions under which the principle seems to have 
 
77. Two other choices with respect to the specification of the Pigou-Dalton principle, orthogonal 
to those just summarized, should be mentioned. First, under conditions of uncertainty regarding 
individual attributes, equity metrics may or may not satisfy an “ex ante” Pigou-Dalton principle. 
Second, in a multiperiod framework, the Pigou-Dalton principle may be applied to individuals’ lifetime 
attribute holdings, or instead to their period-by-period holdings. See ADLER, supra note 28, chs. 5, 6 
(discussing these choices in context of equity-regarding SWFs). How equity metrics make these 
choices, too, is an important aspect of their structure—one with real consequence for empirical work. 
See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being, Inequality and Time: The Time-Slice Problem and Its Policy 
Implications (Inst. for Law and Econ. Research Paper 07–17, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1006871 (documenting empirical differences 
between lifetime and sublifetime approaches to equity); supra note 46 (describing debate about whether 
inequality of consumption—a rough proxy for lifetime income—has increased to the same degree, in 
the U.S., as inequality of lifetime income). 
  However, for the sake of simplicity, I ignore time and uncertainty in this Article and focus on 
exploring the structure of equity metrics as regards (1) “currency,” (2) whether the Pigou-Dalton 
principle is “restricted” to adjust for poverty or social class, and (3) individual responsibility, see Part 
V. 
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considerable normative force.78 The Generic Justification, if accepted, 
implies that some Pigou-Dalton transfers, in some currency, are 
normatively attractive. 
 
The Pigou-Dalton Principle: A Generic Justification 
Assume that (a) one individual (the “transferee”) has a lower level 
of some currency C than a second individual (“the transferor”); (b) 
the transferee is worse off than the transferor; (c) the transferee is 
not responsible for being worse off than the transferor; (d) a Pigou-
Dalton transfer in the currency from the transferor to transferee 
will produce a well-being improvement for the transferee which is 
greater than or equal to the well-being loss for the transferor; (e) 
after the transfer, the transferee will not be better off than the 
transferor; (f) there are no externalities (no one else’s well-being is 
affected). Then the transfer is normatively justified. 
Assume that Toni, a transferee, starts off with amount CToni of some 
currency, and Gregor, a transferor, starts off with amount CGregor, which is 
greater than CToni. Society engineers a Pigou-Dalton transfer from Gregor 
to Toni. (Toni increases her holdings of C by the same amount, ∆C, that 
Gregor loses; and this amount is less than or equal to half the distance 
between their initial holdings of C, so that Toni ends up at CToni + ∆C, 
which is less than or equal to CGregor − ∆C.) Add now the critical facts about 
well-being and responsibility, built into the Generic Justification. CToni is 
not merely a smaller amount of C than CGregor. In addition, Toni gains at 
least as much from the transfer, in well-being terms, as Gregor loses. 
Moreover, before the transfer, Toni is at a lower well-being level than 
Gregor and, even afterwards, is at a lower (or at least not a higher) level. In 
such a case, doesn’t Toni have a stronger normative claim in favor of the 
transfer, than Gregor’s normative claim in opposition? 
Plausibly, the strength of an individual’s normative claim for or against 
some social policy is a function, first, of the impact of the policy upon her 
(the magnitude of her well-being difference pre- and post-policy); and, 
second, her well-being level (whether she is better or worse off than others 
in her society).79 Ceteris paribus, individuals more substantially affected by 
a given policy have stronger claims regarding it; and, ceteris paribus, 
worse-off individuals who stand to be affected by a given policy have 
stronger claims regarding it. But in the case at hand each of these two 
 
78. Cf. ADLER, supra note 28, at 307–51 (defending Pigou-Dalton principle for case where C is 
well-being). 
79. See id. at 339–40;  THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1995); THOMAS NAGEL, 
Equality, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 106 (1979). 
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factors weighs in favor of Toni. Were Toni to benefit from the transfer by 
less than Gregor loses, the first factor would point to Gregor; and were she 
to start and/or finish better off than him, the second might. But (by 
hypothesis) neither is true here. 
To be sure, if Toni were (in some sense) at fault for being at a lower 
pre-transfer level of C than Gregor, that might deflate her normative claim 
to the transfer. And if the transfer harmed other individuals, then their 
claims in opposition—together with Gregor’s—might defeat Toni’s claim 
in favor. But the Generic Justification does not apply in such cases; it 
purports to justify a Pigou-Dalton transfer in some currency only absent 
externalities, and absent transferee responsibility for being comparatively 
worse off. 
The Generic Justification presumes that well-being levels and 
differences are interpersonally comparable, at least to some extent. This is 
not to say that well-being levels and differences are universally 
comparable, merely (and much less controversially) that there are some 
cases in which one individual is genuinely better off than or equally well 
off as  a second, and some cases in which an individual is more affected by 
or equally affected by a choice as compared to a second—as opposed to 
these levels or changes being non-comparable.80 
One objection to the Generic Justification has to do with Pigou-Dalton 
transfers, in some currency C, that increase the gap between the transferee 
and individuals with an even lower level of C. Assume that there are three 
individuals in the population, Able, Baker and Charlie. Able is at level 10, 
with much less C than Baker, at 80, and Charlie, at 100. Ten units of C are 
transferred from Charlie to Baker.  So we have moved from the distribution 
(10, 80, 100) to the distribution (10, 90, 90). This is indeed a Pigou-Dalton 
transfer in C—but it leaves Able “stranded” at the bottom of the 
distribution, even further below the next best off, Baker,  than Able was 
before the transfer. Isn’t it intuitively plausible that the distribution (10, 80, 
100) is actually more equitable than the distribution (10, 90, 90)?81 
A person’s position in the population distribution of some attribute 
might itself affect her well-being. For example, someone’s welfare might 
be (in part) a function of her income relative to those around her—perhaps 
because low relative income tends to cause unhappiness. By virtue of such 
“positional” effects, the distribution (10, 90, 90) might be worse for Able 
than the distribution (10, 80, 100).82 But, if so, the Generic Justification 
 
80. See ADLER, supra note 28, at 185–92. 
81. See, e.g., Ernesto Savaglio, Inequality as Differences: A Simple Characterization, 61 RES. IN 
ECON. 31, 32 (2007); Buhong Zheng, Utility-Gap Dominances and Inequality Orderings, 28 SOC. 
CHOICE & WELFARE 255, 256 (2007). 
82. The revisionary inequality metrics mentioned immediately below, which fail to respect the 
Pigou-Dalton principle, see infra note 83, are regularly justified with reference to the feelings of 
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does not apply. It claims that a Pigou-Dalton transfer in C is justified on the 
condition that there are no externalities. Positional effects, or other kinds of 
effects on the well-being of third parties, certainly could override the 
normative case for a transfer. 
Thus, in considering the plausibility of the Generic Justification, we 
should imagine that Able is equally well off with (10, 80, 100) and (10, 90, 
90). If so, isn’t (10, 90, 90) a normative improvement over (10, 80, 100)?  
Able is unaffected by the choice. Since he is unaffected, why should it 
matter that he is at 10 rather than, say, 150? Presumably the distribution 
(150, 90, 90) is better than the distribution (150, 80, 100)—on the condition 
that the shrinking of the gap between Baker and Charlie has no external 
impact on the well-being of Able. But, if so, why reach a different verdict 
about the comparison of (10, 90, 90) and (10, 80, 100), if that condition still 
holds true? 
The critic of the Generic Justification might respond that (10, 80, 100) 
is a more equal distribution than (10, 90, 90), while (150, 90, 90) is a more 
equal distribution than (150, 80, 100). This change in the degree of 
inequality makes (10, 90, 90) worse than (10, 80, 100) even if Able is 
genuinely unaffected by the transfer from Charlie to Baker. 
But what is the criterion for measuring equality which says that (10, 90, 
90) is less equal than (10, 80, 100)? The first distribution Lorenz-dominates 
the second, and thus every standard inequality metric will say that it is 
more equal. 
To be sure, the critic might try to construct a non-standard inequality 
metric which says that (10, 80, 100) is more equal than (10, 90, 90) while 
(150, 90, 90) is more equal than (150, 80, 100).83 But any such metric will 
be contestable. The Lorenz criterion has real intuitive force (which of 
course explains why the criterion is the linchpin for traditional inequality 
metrics). If one distribution of some attribute Lorenz-dominates a second, 
then—in a straightforward and intuitive way—it is closer to perfect 
equality. 
In short, a strong case can be presented for accepting the Generic 
Justification. Like most normative arguments, this case is not irresistible. 
But it shows why some version of the Pigou-Dalton principle is very 
plausible. 
 
resentment and deprivation that worse-off persons have in virtue of their relative position. See 
CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, at 85; Brice Magdalou & Patrick Moyes, Deprivation, Welfare, and 
Inequality, 32 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 253, 254 (2009). 
83. For discussion of inequality metrics that fail to respect the standard Pigou-Dalton principle, 
see CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, ch. 3; Udo Ebert, Taking Empirical Studies Seriously: The Principle 
of Concentration and the Measurement of Welfare and Inequality, 32 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 555 
(2009); Magdalou & Moyes, supra note 82; Savaglio, supra note 81. 
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The Generic Justification, in turn, is a tool that we can use to evaluate 
different equity metrics. We can now ask: do the transfers approved by that 
metric approximate the conditions identified by the Generic Justification? 
First, does the metric employ an appropriate currency (given that 
Justification)? Second, insofar as it restricts the transfers (as do poverty and 
social-gradient metrics), is that appropriate? It is to these questions that we 
now turn. 
III. WHAT IS THE BEST CURRENCY FOR THE PIGOU-DALTON PRINCIPLE? 
What is the best currency for the Pigou-Dalton principle? This Part 
grapples with the question and shows why it is a contestable one—at least 
at present, absent a consensus about how to construct an interpersonally 
comparable84 measure of well-being. 
Inequality and poverty metrics traditionally focus on the distribution of 
income, and, paradigmatically, satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle (at least a 
restricted version thereof) in the space of income.85 While income has 
attractive features as a currency for the Pigou-Dalton, it also possesses 
major deficits. The Generic Justification provides an analytic lens that 
brings the deficits of an income currency into clear view. But it remains 
disputable how to specify an alternative currency that will redress all of 
these imperfections. 
The advantage of an income currency is that income is both readily 
measurable and widely useful in improving well-being (given the existence 
of markets)—so that income and well-being levels correlate. What are its 
disadvantages? First, because of positional effects, a Pigou-Dalton transfer 
in income may lower the well-being of third parties and thus, on balance, 
be inequitable. Second, quite apart from positional effects, a Pigou-Dalton 
transfer in income may be inequitable if the transferee has a higher level 
than the transferor of some non-economic good (health, environmental 
quality, a happy disposition, social life, etc.)—sufficiently so that the 
transfer is regressive in terms of well-being, making a better-off (if lower 
income) transferee yet better off, and a worse-off (if higher income) 
transferor yet worse off. The point here is that income and well-being 
levels are only imperfectly correlated. Third, a pure transfer in income may 
be a “leaky” transfer in well-being: the transferee may gain less, in well-
 
84. A plausible measure of well-being may have some “gaps” with respect to interpersonal 
comparisons of well-being levels and differences, but it should not wholly eschew such comparisons, or 
make them so rarely as to contradict our intuitions about hypothetical or real-world cases in which 
interpersonal comparisons seem to be possible. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
85. I say “paradigmatically” because there are some income poverty metrics (albeit disapproved 
in the theoretical literature) that fail to satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle even restricted to transfers 
between poor individuals. See supra text accompanying notes 60–61. 
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being terms, than the transferor loses. This is possible (although 
empirically unlikely) even if both individuals are identical in non-income 
attributes. It is possible (and empirically more plausible) where their non-
income attributes differ.86 
The three observations in the previous paragraph all point to different 
ways in which a Pigou-Dalton transfer in income might fail to meet the 
conditions identified by the Generic Justification. A different observation is 
this: income-poverty and income-equality metrics fail to satisfy the Pigou-
Dalton principle with respect to non-income currencies. A Pigou-Dalton 
transfer in health, for example, is not registered by such metrics (unless it 
happens to change incomes). But a Pigou-Dalton transfer in health, without 
any impact on income, obviously could be a net positive for equity. 
The deficits of using income (or some other economic resource) as the 
“currency” for the Pigou-Dalton principle are, clearly, not resolved by 
using another, single, currency—if that attribute is simply one aspect of 
well-being, rather than an inclusive measure of well-being. For example, 
measuring equity by applying a unidimensional inequality or poverty 
metric to the distribution of longevity is vulnerable to all the criticisms just 
leveled against income-based inequality and poverty metrics. 
Multidimensional inequality and poverty metrics, recall, have multiple 
currencies for the Pigou-Dalton principle. Such measures quantify equity as 
a function of individual attainment on a multiplicity of well-being relevant 
dimensions. Interest in them has been fueled by the (correctly) perceived 
deficits of the traditional, income-based approach to measuring poverty and 
inequality.87 Critiques of income as the distribuendum for equity are 
standard fare in the “multidimensional” literature.88 
However, the multidimensional approach is hardly a panacea.  
Consider, first, dimension-by-dimension metrics. This methodology applies 
an inequality or poverty metric to each dimension and then calculates 
multidimensional inequality or poverty as the average (or some similar 
function) of the dimensional values.89 Thus, a Pigou-Dalton transfer in any 
one of the dimensions will reduce multidimensional inequality (and 
multidimensional poverty, depending on where the dimension-specific 
poverty lines are set). 
 
86. A further objection to applying the Pigou-Dalton principle to income (or any other single 
attribute which is only one aspect of well-being) is that this can conflict with the Pareto principle. See 
ADLER, supra note 28, at 114–17; see also infra text accompanying notes 93–94 (discussing conflicts 
between multidimensional Pigou-Dalton principle and Pareto principle). 
87. See A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon, The Comparison of Multi-Dimensioned Distributions 
of Economic Status, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 183, 183–85 (1982). 
88. See, e.g., id.; Bourguignon & Chakravarty, supra note 62, at 25–27; Erik Thorbecke, Issues 
Related to the Concept of Multidimensional Poverty, in THE MANY DIMENSIONS OF POVERTY, supra 
note 62, at 3–5; Tsui, supra note 62, at 71–72. 
89. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
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But a Pigou-Dalton transfer in any single dimension, taken alone, may 
be regressive in terms of well-being. To illustrate, assume that there are 
five dimensions taken account of by the metric, and a Pigou-Dalton transfer 
in the first dimension occurs. Before the transfer, the transferee has bundle 
(a, b, c, d, e), while the transferor has bundle (a*, b*, c*, d*, e*).  The 
transferor’s holdings of the first attribute, a*, are greater than the 
transferee’s, a. After the transfer, the bundles become (a + ∆a , b , c , d, e) 
and (a* − ∆a, b*, c*, d*, e*). Since b, c, d, and e may well be greater than, 
respectively, b*, c*, d*, and e*, the transfer on the first dimension may 
have the perverse effect of making a better-off person yet better off. 
The proponent of the dimension-by-dimension approach might resist 
this attack by denying the comparability of well-being levels and 
differences or the relevance of interpersonal well-being comparisons to 
equity—in effect, rejecting the Generic Justification and offering some 
alternative, non-welfarist “story” in favor of the Pigou-Dalton principle.90  
Even so, the dimension-by-dimension approach is hardly impeccable. A 
Pigou-Dalton transfer on any one dimension might, on balance, be unfair to 
the transferor if the transferee has a higher level on other dimension(s).91  
Even the non-welfarist should be able to see the force of this objection to 
the approach. 
“Sophisticated” multidimensional inequality or poverty metrics do not 
merely average dimension-specific measures. They may therefore have the 
feature of preferring a transfer in one dimension only if appropriately 
coordinated with transfers in other dimensions. For example, a 
“sophisticated” metric might only see a transfer as increasing equity if the 
transferor is better off than the transferee in all dimensions.92 This 
stipulation would allow the “sophisticated” approach to avoid the 
objections to the dimension-by-dimension approach offered in the previous 
two paragraphs. 
However, other objections remain. Perhaps the most serious one is that 
multidimensional inequality and poverty metrics—sophisticated as well as 
dimension-by-dimension—can come into conflict with the Pareto 
principle.93 Let d and dʹ be two multidimensional distributions. The Pareto 
 
90. Although a strong case can be made that well-being (adjusted for responsibility) is the 
appropriate currency for assessments of fair distribution, this remains controversial. See generally 
Richard Arneson, Welfare Should be the Currency for Justice, 30 CAN. J. PHIL. 497 (2000). 
91. See Daniel M. Hausman, What’s Wrong with Health Inequalities?, 15 J. POL. PHILOSOPHY 46 
(2006). 
92. See Lasso de la Vega, supra note 45. 
93. On conflicts between the Pigou-Dalton and Pareto principles in the multidimensional context, 
see Marc Fleurbaey, Social Welfare, Priority to the Worst-Off and the Dimensions of Individual Well-
Being, in INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 38, at 225, 238–342; Marc Fleurbaey 
& Alain Trannoy, The Impossibility of a Paretian Egalitarian, 21 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 243 
(2003). 
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principle says: (1) If everyone is indifferent between d and dʹ, the two 
distributions are equally good; and (2) if everyone either prefers dʹ to d or 
is indifferent, and at least one individual prefers dʹ to d, then dʹ is better. 
One version of a “coordinated” multidimensional Pigou-Dalton principle 
says that if dʹ is reached from d via a Pigou-Dalton transfer on any single 
dimension, and the transferor starts off with higher levels on all 
dimensions, then dʹ is better than d.94 
It turns out that these two principles are logically inconsistent. It is 
impossible to come up with an integrated procedure for ranking 
distributions that satisfies both principles—as shown by the example in 
Table 2 immediately below. 
 
Table 2: Multidimensional Pigou-Dalton versus Pareto 
 Distribution d A           B 
Distribution d* 
A            B 
Distribution d** 
A           B 
Distribution d*** 
A            B 
Individual 1 15             1 16              2 3            17 4            18 
Individual 2 18             4 17              3 2            16 1            15 
 
Explanation: The A and B columns show the individuals’ levels of each 
attribute in distributions d, d*, d**, and d***. Note that, in distribution d, 
Individual 2 has more of each attribute than Individual 1, and d* is 
reached from d by a Pigou-Dalton transfer in both attributes. Similarly, 
Individual 1 has more of each attribute in distribution d***, and 
distribution d** is reached by a Pigou-Dalton transfer in both attributes. 
But imagine that the individuals’ preferences are such that: first, they are 
each indifferent between their bundles in d and their bundles in d**; and, 
second, they are each indifferent between their bundles in d* and their 
bundles in d***. 
With these preferences, it is impossible to rank the distributions in a 
manner that respects both the Pareto principle and the Pigou-Dalton 
 
A different objection to the multidimensional approach is that one or more dimension-specific transfers 
may yield a leaky rather than pure transfer in well-being (thus departing from the conditions identified 
by the Generic Justification), where one individual gains less in well-being than a second loses. Note 
that this is true even for a sophisticated approach which requires the transferor to be better off in all 
dimensions. 
94. Not only is this principle satisfied by some “sophisticated” multidimensional inequality 
metrics; note that it is also satisfied by the dimension-by-dimension approach, which prefers a Pigou-
Dalton transfer in any dimension regardless of the comparative position of transferee and transferor on 
other dimensions. 
What about the other standard multidimensional Pigou-Dalton principle—preferring an 
equiproportional transfer in all dimensions? ADLER, supra note 28, at 117–18, illustrates how this 
principle can conflict with the Pareto principle. 
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principle (either the dimension-by-dimension version, or the version 
limited to transfers where the transferor has more of each attribute). The 
Pareto principle requires that d is equally good as d**, and that d* is 
equally good as d***. The Pigou-Dalton principle requires that d* is 
better than d and that d** is better than d***. These can’t both be true. 
The Pareto principle has strong normative appeal. It lies at the core of 
welfare economics (as readers surely know), just as the Pigou-Dalton 
principle is foundational to equity measurement. It would be nice to show 
that these two grand normative projects are compatible: that we can 
endorse Pigou-Dalton transfers (in an appropriate currency), without 
inevitably running afoul of the Pareto principle. Unfortunately, the 
multidimensional “currency” for Pigou-Dalton does not enable such happy 
reconciliation. 
What about using an inclusive measure of individual well-being as the 
currency for Pigou-Dalton? For any bundle of attributes someone might 
possess (including both economic resources, such as income, and any non-
economic attributes the equity researcher might wish to include), an 
inclusive measure of individual well-being assigns that bundle a single 
number quantifying its well-being value, integrating information about all 
the attributes. Equity is then measured as a function of the distribution of 
these well-being values. 
As discussed above, equity-regarding social welfare functions (SWFs) 
follow this strategy. In particular, they employ utility as an inclusive well-
being indicator. The SWF approach assumes that “utility” has the following 
features: First, utility covaries with preferences, meaning that any given 
individual has greater utility in one outcome as compared to a second iff95 
she prefers the first outcome to the second. Second, utility mirrors 
interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels and differences. One 
person’s utility is greater than a second’s iff the first person is better off 
than the second (and similarly for well-being differences).96 
Assume that a utility indicator with these features can be constructed. 
Then we can readily achieve the desired integration of efficiency and 
equity—of the Pareto principle and the Pigou-Dalton principle. Given any 
set of possible distributions—distributions of bundles of both economic and 
non-economic attributes among a population—our utility measure will 
translate each distribution into a list of individual utilities. An equity-
 
95. “Iff” means “if and only if.” 
96. See ADLER, supra note 28, at 61–88. On a broader view, “utility” is a measure of well-being 
(even a non-preference-based account of well-being). More traditionally, economists (including those in 
the SWF tradition) use “utility” as a measure of preferences—and because I believe a strong case can be 
made for analyzing well-being in terms of preferences (perhaps appropriately “laundered” preferences), 
I stick to that usage here. See id. ch. 3. 
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regarding SWF will rank the lists and corresponding distributions in a 
logically coherent (transitive) fashion. Moreover, if two distributions are 
such that some individuals have more utility in the first, and no one has less 
utility in the first, any equity-regarding SWF will rank the first distribution 
higher.97 This assures consistency with the Pareto principle (on the 
assumption that we have a measure of utility that covaries with 
preferences). Finally, if one distribution is reached from a second by a 
Pigou-Dalton transfer in utility, an equity-regarding SWF will rank the first 
distribution higher. Thus (on the assumption that utility mirrors 
interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels and differences) a Pigou-
Dalton transfer in utility will always meet the conditions set forth by the 
Generic Justification.98 
However, producing a measure of utility with the desired features is not 
straightforward. The difficulty arises because of the heterogeneity of 
preferences. Consider, first, the case in which everyone has the same 
preferences, including risk preferences: the same ranking of attribute 
bundles and the same ranking of lotteries over bundles. Then there will be a 
function, u, the mathematical expectation of which represents these 
common preferences. Clearly, such a u does secure consistency with the 
Pareto principle. Moreover, if B is a bundle held by Jim, and B* held by 
Sue, u(B) > u(B*) means that both individuals (and everyone else) prefer 
the first bundle to the second—so it seems very plausible that Jim with B 
does indeed have a higher level of well-being than Sue with B*. Finally, u 
in the case of common preferences is at least a plausible interpersonally 
comparable measure of well-being differences. 
But where preferences are heterogeneous, it less clear how to arrive at 
utility.99 Where Jim, Sue, Randy, etc., rank bundles differently, there is a 
function uJim that represents Jim’s preferences; a different function, uSue, 
that represents Sue’s; yet a different function, uRandy, that represents 
Randy’s; and so forth. If we pick Jim’s function as our measure of utility 
(say), and use that as the input to our SWF, the Pareto principle may be 
violated, since uJim does not track Sue’s preferences or Randy’s—and, in 
any event, it seems arbitrarily “dictatorial” to give priority to one person’s 
preferences in assigning a well-being value to attribute bundles for the 
purposes of social decision making. 
Thus, in the case of heterogeneous preferences, in order to assign a 
“utility” number to attribute bundles—where these numbers will, in turn, 
serve as the input for an equity-regarding SWF or some other equity 
 
97. Throughout the Article, I focus on standard, “Paretian” SWF that have the monotonicity 
feature just described.  See ADLER, supra note 28, at 70-71, 307-08. 
98. See id. at 119–24, 339–51. 
99. See id. at 199–200, 279–84. 
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metric—we will somehow need to take account of the plurality of 
individual functions representing each individual’s preferences over the 
bundles. Although there are intelligible proposals for how to do this, these 
proposals have arguable flaws or lacunae.100 The SWF literature often tends 
to overlook the problem of measuring utility in the case of heterogeneous 
preferences, and certainly has not arrived at a plausible, consensus solution 
to that problem.101 
The concept of “equivalent” income is one proposal for handling 
heterogeneous preferences in the construction of an inclusive measure of 
individual well-being—a proposal recently much discussed by economic 
theorists.102 The idea here is to normalize someone’s income so that it 
reflects her level of non-income attributes. More precisely, some “reference 
bundle” of non-income attributes is specified. The equivalent income of a 
given individual is such that she is indifferent between that amount and the 
reference bundle of non-income attributes, as compared to her actual 
income and actual non-income attributes.103 “Equivalent income” can then 
function as the input to an inequality or poverty metric, SWF, or social-
gradient metric. 
“Equivalent income” has substantial attractions as a currency for the 
Pigou-Dalton principle. Unlike actual income, it reflects non-income 
attributes. And there is no logical inconsistency between requiring the 
ranking of distributions to satisfy both the Pareto principle and the Pigou-
Dalton principle in terms of equivalent income.104 But this proposed 
currency is hardly perfect. The Pigou-Dalton principle framed in terms of 
 
100. In my own work, I have developed the concept of “extended preferences” as a basis for 
interpersonal comparisons. A given “spectator” or “deliberator” develops a well-being ranking of 
bundles of attributes (I also use the term “history”), and in so doing may choose to respect the 
preferences of the individuals (“subjects”) who possess the attributes. I use the term “extended 
preferences” to refer to such a ranking. Different spectators may have different extended preferences, 
and one way to accommodate such diversity is to pool them. See id. at 201–36; Matthew Adler, 
Extended Preferences, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D. 
Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); Matthew Adler, Extended Preferences and 
Interpersonal Comparisons: A New Account, 30 ECON. AND PHIL. 123 (2014). 
An objection to the pooling of extended preferences is that this may yield too much incomparability 
with respect to well-being levels and differences. See Alex Voorhoeve, Book Review, 42 SOC. CHOICE 
& WELFARE 245 (2014). Even leaving aside pooling, a lacuna in my extended-preferences framework is 
the absence of a specific theory for scaling the von Neumann-Morgenstern functions representing the 
preferences of subjects with different tastes. The theory allows for various such scalings, but gives no 
definitive recommendations about which to choose. See Adler, Extended Preferences. Further 
refinement of the framework will, I hope, close this gap. 
101. See ROBIN BOADWAY, FROM OPTIMAL TAX THEORY TO TAX POLICY 199–217 (2012). 
102. See generally MARC FLEURBAEY & DIDIER BLANCHET, BEYOND GDP: MEASURING 
WELFARE AND ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY ch. 4 (2013); Marc Fleurbaey, Equivalent Income, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D. Adler and Marc Fleurbaey 
eds., forthcoming 2015). 
103. See Fleurbaey, supra note 102. 
104. See ADLER, supra note 28, at 124–30. 
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equivalent income may fail to prefer a policy that meets the Generic 
Justification, and vice versa.105 
“Happiness” is yet another possible currency—as in recent empirical 
work that quantifies the inequality of happiness, based on responses to 
happiness surveys.106 On one view, someone’s happiness is simply one 
dimension of her well-being. More ambitiously, a response to an 
appropriately constructed happiness survey might be seen as an inclusive 
measure: someone who expresses a higher happiness number is, all things 
considered, better off. 107 
The viability of happiness as an inclusive measure is a complex 
question, which I have elsewhere discussed at length.108 In brief, the 
proponent of this approach faces a dilemma. (1) Someone’s answer to a 
happiness question might be seen as an indicator of the quality of her 
experiences: whether she feels pain, avoids pleasure, has a sense of 
satisfaction about what she does, etc. But such an indicator can only be a 
reflection of someone’s all-things-considered well-being if well-being is 
mentalistic: if someone’s experiences are the only intrinsic source of well-
being. And that is a highly controversial view about well-being. (2) 
Alternatively, someone’s answer to a happiness survey might be taken as 
an indicator of how well her preferences are satisfied. In short, it indicates 
her “utility.” But, even in the case where individuals have identical 
preferences (so that the construction of a utility metric is relatively 
straightforward), it need not be true that a higher happiness score signals 
higher utility, or that differences in happiness scores mirror differences in 
 
105. To see this in a simple way, imagine that in d all individuals actually have the reference 
bundle of non-income attributes. If well-being is an increasing, concave function of income with non-
income attributes fixed at the reference bundle, then there will be cases where dʹ is produced from d via 
a leaky transfer of income from a higher- to a lower-income individual, thus is not a Pigou-Dalton 
transfer in equivalent income, but is a Pigou-Dalton transfer in well-being. Conversely, if well-being is 
an increasing, convex function of income with non-income attributes fixed at the reference bundle, then 
there will be cases where dʹ is produced from d via a Pigou-Dalton transfer in equivalent income but is 
not a Pigou-Dalton transfer in well-being. 
The proponent of equivalent-income might respond that well-being is linear in income at the reference 
bundle of non-income attributes. However, it is hard to see why this would be true (for any choice of 
reference bundle). It is a truism about well-being that income has non-constant (e.g., diminishing) 
marginal utility. 
A second and more subtle difficulty with using equivalent income as the currency for the Pigou-Dalton 
principle is that it fails to differentiate between individuals with the same ordinal preferences but 
different risk preferences. See Adler, Extended Preferences, supra note 100. 
106. See Clark et al., supra note 15; Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 15, at S33; Ruut 
Veenhoven & Wim Kalmijn, Inequality-Adjusted Happiness in Nations, 6 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 421 
(2005). Happiness has also been used as the currency for poverty measurement. See G.G. Kingdon & J. 
Knight, Subjective Well-Being Poverty vs. Income Poverty and Capabilities Poverty, 42 J. DEV. STUD. 
1199 (2006). 
107.  See Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use? 62 DUKE 
L.J. 1509 (2013) 
108. See id. 
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utility.109 Nor is it clear that using happiness scores is an attractive solution 
to the much harder problem of constructing a utility metric when 
individuals have heterogeneous preferences. 
In summary, from a welfarist perspective, the ideal currency for the 
Pigou-Dalton principle would be an inclusive measure of well-being. More 
specifically—for anyone who endorses a preference-based view of well-
being and, therewith, the Pareto principle—the ideal currency would be an 
interpersonally comparable measure of individual utility. But it remains 
controversial how to construct such utilities once preference heterogeneity 
enters the picture. Reciprocally, currencies other than an inclusive well-
being measure have clear imperfections. At least some such imperfections, 
summarized in Table 3 below, characterize not only traditional income and 
poverty metrics but also metrics that employ another single currency as 
well as multidimensional metrics, a newer tool. However, the continuing 
presence of equity metrics with these sorts of currencies is understandable 
and, to some extent, justified as a “second-best” matter, absent a clearly 
viable inclusive well-being measure. 
 
 
109. The problem is that different individuals may use different utility scales to express the 
common preferences, or give a response to a happiness question that expresses their feelings rather than 
“utility” in the sense of preference-satisfaction. See id. 
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Table 3: The Pros and Cons of Different “Currencies” for the Pigou- 
Dalton Principle 
 
 
Transferee might be 
better off (even 
though at lower level 
of currency)? 
Transfer might be 
“leaky” in terms of 
well-being (well-
being increase of 
transferee less than 
loss of transferor)? 
Potential 
conflict with 
Pareto 
principle? 
Income Yes Yes Yes 
Any other single 
dimension of 
individual well-being 
(e.g., health) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Multiple Dimensions 
 
Simple approach (a      
transfer along any 
dimension improves 
equity) 
 
“Sophisticated” 
approach (only 
coordinated transfers 
improve equity) 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No* (if coordination 
requirement 
appropriately 
specified) 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
Equivalent Income No* Yes* (if unlikely) No 
Utility No No No 
 
Explanation: The “No” entries marked by an asterisk assume that well-
being is increasing in each attribute (both income and the other attributes). 
It is possible but unlikely that a Pigou-Dalton transfer in equivalent 
income will be leaky in well-being, for reasons discussed in note 105 
above. 
IV. SHOULD THE PIGOU-DALTON PRINCIPLE BE “RESTRICTED”? HEREIN 
OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL-GRADIENT METRICS 
Traditional inequality metrics and equity-regarding SWFs illustrate the 
Pigou-Dalton principle in its simplest, unrestricted form. The Gini 
coefficient, applied to the distribution of income, is such that a Pigou-
Dalton transfer in income from anyone at a higher level of income, to 
anyone at a lower level, reduces the degree of inequality. Similarly, equity-
regarding SWFs prefer a Pigou-Dalton transfer in utility from anyone at a 
higher level of utility, to anyone at a lower level. 
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A “restricted” version of the Pigou-Dalton principle, in some currency, 
prefers only a subset of transfers in that currency. In this Part, I normatively 
evaluate the two types of restrictions embodied by equity metrics that are 
currently in wide use: a restriction defined by the transferee’s and 
transferor’s location relative to the poverty line (embodied by poverty 
metrics), and a restriction defined by their social class (embodied by social-
gradient metrics). 
A. Poverty Metrics 
As we saw in Part I, there are different ways in which the poverty line 
might function to restrict the scope of the Pigou-Dalton principle. For 
example, an income poverty metric might prefer every Pigou-Dalton 
transfer in income from a poor person (someone who lies below the 
income-poverty line) to someone even poorer, but not necessarily every 
Pigou-Dalton transfer in income from a non-poor person to a poor person. 
By contrast, the widely favored “FGT” income-poverty metric is fairly 
expansive in its sensitivity to transfers. If the FGT parameter α is above 1, 
any Pigou-Dalton transfer in which the transferee is poor reduces the 
measured degree of poverty.110 
However, every income-poverty metric (including the FGT metric and 
every other) is insensitive to transfers between non-poor individuals.  
Income-poverty metrics simply do not take account of the income 
distribution above the poverty line; this is a universal, constitutive feature 
of such metrics. Similarly, every multidimensional poverty metric is such 
that a transfer (in one or more dimensions) between two individuals who 
are decisively non-poor—who have above-thresholds attainments in all 
dimensions—will have no effect on the measured degree of poverty. 
In short, all poverty metrics are insensitive (at least) to transfers 
between the non-poor. Why would this restriction be justified? 
One argument for the restriction is based upon a normative view, 
“sufficientism,” defended by the contemporary moral philosopher Roger 
Crisp.111 “Sufficientists” contend that a Pigou-Dalton transfer in well-being 
is a matter of normative indifference—not a normative improvement—if 
the transferee and transferor are both sufficiently well-off. Crisp supports 
this contention by describing a hypothetical case—the “Beverly Hills” 
case—in which society has to choose between giving fine wine to rich 
individuals or to super-rich individuals, where the welfare benefit of 
drinking the wine is the same for both types. He argues that it makes no 
difference who gets the wine. 
 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 56–59. 
111. Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745 (2003). 
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It seems somewhat absurd to think that the Rich should be given 
priority over the Super-rich . . . . [W]hat the Beverly Hills case 
brings out is that, once recipients are at a certain level, any 
prioritarian concern for them disappears entirely. This implies that 
any version of the priority view must fail: when people reach a 
certain level, even if they are worse off than others, benefiting 
them does not, in itself, matter more. And this seems to me to be 
true even if, in a Beverly Hills case, the utilities are equal. That is, 
even if the benefits to each of the Rich and the Super-rich are 
identical and their numbers are the same, there still seems to me 
nothing to be said for giving priority to the “worse off.” At this 
level, only [the sum total of] utilities matter, so there would be 
nothing to choose between the two distributions.112 
The Beverly Hills case seems to provide intuitive support for 
sufficientism. However, such intuitions may weaken if we think carefully 
about the case and keep in mind that (as Crisp constructs the case) having 
fine wine is supposed to improve the well-being of the rich and super-rich, 
rather than being a frivolous gesture that make no welfare difference at 
all.113 
Assume that Richie is indeed very well-off but that Super-Richie is yet 
better off. It’s not merely that Super-Richie’s life is piled up with more 
material luxuries than Richie’s. (After all, someone could have more 
material luxuries without being better off.) Rather, Super-Richie’s life is 
really better for well-being than Richie’s. Moreover, Super-Richie (and, a 
fortiori, Richie) is not yet at the maximum of human well-being. 
As it turns out, Society has some indivisible item which would improve 
either Richie’s life or Super-Richie’s—indeed, by the same amount—and 
which no one else cares about. Society could just discard the item, but 
anyone who thinks Society should do that will run headlong into the Pareto 
principle. Now, if both Richie and Super-Richie were badly off, the choice 
between them would not be a matter of indifference (as Crisp would 
concede). Richie would be the appropriate recipient. Why would that be the 
case? Plausibly, for the reason I sketched earlier, arguing for the Generic 
Justification: Richie’s claim to the item (understood as a function both of 
Richie’s well-being level, and of the difference the item would make to 
 
112. Id. at 755. Although Crisp focuses specifically here on prioritarianism, his critique is really a 
broader critique of any scheme for ranking outcomes (formalized by some type of “equity-regarding” 
SWF) that satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle in the currency of well-being without regard to whether 
the transferee is above some well-being threshold. 
113. For critiques of sufficientism, see Adler, supra note 28, at 345–51; Paula Casal, Why 
Sufficiency Is Not Enough, 117 ETHICS 296 (2007); Larry Temkin, Egalitarianism Defended, 113 
ETHICS 764 (2003). 
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him) would be stronger than Super-Richie’s (similarly understood). Why, 
now, does Richie’s comparatively stronger claim evaporate if both he and 
Super-Richie are above some well-being threshold? If the Pareto principle 
doesn’t disappear above a threshold, why does the Pigou-Dalton principle? 
Relatedly, it is unclear how the sufficientist means to specify the 
limitation on the scope of the Pigou-Dalton principle. Supposedly, a Pigou-
Dalton transfer, in well-being, to someone whose well-being level is above 
some threshold, is a matter of normative indifference—not an improvement 
in equity. But where is that normative threshold? 
Sufficientism offers one—controversial—justification for the 
restriction in scope of the Pigou-Dalton principle embodied by poverty 
metrics. The traditional argument for poverty lines is different. This 
argument sees the poverty line with respect to some individual attribute (be 
it income, or some non-income attribute) as the threshold for satisfying 
minimum human needs (whether defined in absolute terms, for example as 
what someone needs for physical survival, or in relative terms, as what 
someone needs to be accorded basic respect in her society).114 In effect, the 
poverty line marks a “discontinuity” in the relation between that attribute 
and an individual’s well-being.115 Below a certain level of income, 
someone’s life is qualitatively worse: she becomes socially excluded 
because of her inability to buy the material goods that society values, may 
lack money to purchase sufficient food, etc. Similarly, someone who lacks 
reliable shelter, or minimal education, or companionship, is living a 
categorically different (and worse) kind of life than someone whose basic 
needs are satisfied. 
This line of analysis helps to justify poverty metrics as one component 
of an overall assessment of equity, if we lack a workable inclusive measure 
of well-being (in particular, an interpersonally comparable utility 
indicator). Absent such a measure, it seems quite plausible to bifurcate the 
assessment of equity. First, what progress is society making in reducing the 
very grave inequity that occurs when some individuals lack minimally 
decent lives? Second, how inequitable is the distribution of economic and 
non-economic resources more generally—including, now, inequities 
between those who have enough in all dimensions to be non-poor, and 
others yet better off? The first step in this bifurcated analysis would involve 
a poverty metric. It would mean focusing on the number and attainment of 
individuals who have below-threshold incomes or non-income attainments, 
 
114. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Issues in the Measurement of Poverty, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 
285, 288–89 (1979). 
115. Sufficientism sees a discontinuity within moral assessment itself; there is some level of well-
being at which the Pigou-Dalton principle is no longer morally compelling. By contrast, the view now 
under discussion sees a discontinuity in the determination of individual well-being—in how attributes 
produce well-being at the level of each individual. 
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and ignoring Pigou-Dalton transfers among non-poor individuals—for 
purposes of this first step (not the second). 
It is less clear why such bifurcated assessment would be warranted 
given a workable, interpersonally comparable utility function.116 Such an 
indicator (to be fully adequate) would need somehow to reflect, in its 
mathematical structure,117 the discontinuity with respect to well-being that 
occurs around a poverty line. Utility (or the rate of increase of utility) 
would “jump” at that point. An equity-regarding SWF could then be 
applied to the distribution of utility in a single, unified assessment of 
equity—with the Pigou-Dalton principle taking utility (unrestrictedly) as its 
currency, and with no need for a poverty metric at all. 
But, as explained in Part III, constructing an inclusive measure of well-
being continues to pose challenges. Absent such a measure, the use of 
poverty metrics as one component of equity analysis—and the attendant 
insensitivity of this component to Pigou-Dalton transfers among non-
poor—has substantial appeal. 
B. Social-Gradient Metrics 
Social-gradient metrics look at the comparative attainment of 
individuals with different social statuses—using some proxy for status.118  
The concentration index is a dominant such metric, which often is 
employed to quantify social-status skews in health, but in principle can be 
used to quantify skews in any currency C. With some C as its input, the 
concentration index satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle with respect to C 
where the transferor (the individual with more C) has higher social status 
than the transferee (the individual with less C). But the Pigou-Dalton 
principle is not satisfied (1) in cases where the transferor has lower social 
status than the transferee, nor (2) in cases where the two individuals have 
the same social status.119  Why would these restrictions be justified? 
A straightforward argument for status-based restriction (1) is that 
having a higher status is itself a substantial boost to well-being. Thus, the 
 
116. Cf. Martin Ravallion, Measuring Social Welfare with and Without Poverty Lines, 84 AEA 
PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 359, 360 (1994) (suggesting that empirical difficulties in measuring well-
being and uncertainties about the parameters of a social welfare function help to justify poverty 
metrics). 
117. See John Creedy, Labour Supply and Social Welfare when Utility Depends on a Threshold 
Consumption Level, 73 ECON. RECORD 159 (1997); G.W. Lewis & D.T. Ulph, Poverty, Inequality and 
Welfare, 98 ECON. J. 117 (1988). 
118. The desirability of social-gradient versus population-wide measures of health inequality is 
one of the themes of an important recent book: INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH: CONCEPTS, MEASURES, AND 
ETHICS (Nir Eyal, Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim & Dan Wikler eds., 2013). This Article was written 
prior to the publication of the book, and the analysis of social-gradient metrics that follows has not been 
refined to take account of it. 
119. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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Generic Justification often does not apply where the transferee has higher 
status, since her status advantage may compensate for her comparative 
deficit in C and make her better off than the transferor, all-things-
considered. This argument, note, hinges on the absence of an inclusive 
measure of well-being that itself incorporates status effects.120 Moreover, 
the argument does nothing to explain status-based restriction (2). 
A different kind of argument—one that helps to explain both status-
based restrictions—has to do with individual responsibility. Such an 
argument can be drawn from the work of Iris Marion Young, a philosopher 
who has provided one of the fullest defenses to date of the social-gradient 
format for conceptualizing equity. Young argues: 
[I]f we simply identify some inequality of condition or situation 
between individuals at  a particular time we have no account of the 
causes of this unequal condition. It is the causes and consequences 
of some pattern of inequality, rather than the pattern itself, that 
raise issues of justice. If the causes of an inequality lie in the 
uncoerced and considered decisions and preferences of the less 
well-off persons, for example, then the inequality is probably not 
unjust . . . . 
. . . [However], the causes of many inequalities of resources or 
opportunities among individuals lie in social institutions, their rules 
and relations, and the decisions others make within them that affect 
the lives of the individuals compared.121 
Young concludes that an inequality must be a “structural inequality” to 
be a central concern of distributive justice. “Structural 
inequality . . . consists in the relative constraints some people encounter in 
their freedom and material well-being as the cumulative effect of the 
possibilities of their social positions, as compared with others who in their 
social positions have more options or easier access to benefits.”122 
Young’s suggestion dovetails with the “responsibility-sensitive” strain 
of modern egalitarianism, pioneered by Ronald Dworkin and Richard 
Arneson.123 Dworkin and Arneson’s insight was that equality of welfare 
 
120. Cf. Thomas Aronsson & Olof Johansson-Stenman, When the Joneses’ Consumption Hurts: 
Optimal Public Good Provision and Nonlinear Income Taxation, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 986 (2008) 
(discussing utility functions where an individual’s well-being depends upon her relative as well as 
absolute income). 
121. Iris Marion Young, Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice, 9 J. POL. 
PHIL. 1, 8. (2001). 
122. Id. at 15. 
123. Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1989); 
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); 
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981). 
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could not be the criterion of distributive justice, since well-being 
inequalities might be the result of poor individual choices, rather than bad 
luck or unfair conditions. 
Individuals can arrive at different welfare levels due to choices 
they make for which they alone should be held responsible. A 
simple example would be to imagine two persons of identical tastes 
and abilities who are assigned equal resources by an agency 
charged to maintain distributive equality. The two then voluntarily 
engage in high-stakes gambling, from which one emerges 
rich . . . and the other poor . . . . In . . . [another] example, one 
person may voluntarily cultivate an expensive preference . . . , 
while another person does not. In . . . [these] examples it would be 
inappropriate to insist upon equality of welfare when welfare 
inequality arises through the voluntary choice of the person who 
gets lesser welfare.124 
Note that the Generic Justification is alive to the responsibility-
egalitarian insight by including the transferee’s lack of responsibility for 
being worse off as one condition for a justified transfer. 
Now, Young’s insight is that inequality caused by poor social position 
is sufficient to meet the responsibility-egalitarian test. If Leela has less 
income, or life expectancy, or happiness, or health than Morris because of 
the fact that Leela is lower status, that inequality is not Leela’s fault. This 
insight is clearly correct, if social position itself largely flows from 
immutable characteristics such as race or gender. But what of the case 
where someone’s social position may be partly determined by her own 
prior choices—for example, in societies where income substantially shapes 
social position? 
Even leaving aside the mutability of social position itself, Young’s 
analysis can be criticized for conflating a sufficient condition for unjust 
inequality with a necessary condition. Assume that Max, like Leela, is 
worse off than Morris, but (unlike her) shares Morris’s social position. It 
hardly follows from responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism that the 
Max/Morris disparity is normatively neutral. Obviously, factors outside 
Max’s control, other than his social position, might account for his being 
worse off than Morris. He might have been mistreated by his parents, 
victimized in a home invasion, hit by a negligent driver, systematically 
harassed by malicious coworkers, etc. 
 
Much of the subsequent philosophical literature on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is cited in 
Nicholas Barry, Reassessing Luck Egalitarianism, 70 J. POL. 136 (2008). 
124. Arneson, supra note 123, at 83–84. 
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Still, the proponent of the social-gradient approach to measuring equity 
might repackage Young’s analysis—seeing social position not as a strictly 
necessary or sufficient condition for injustice but as a workable proxy for 
responsibility. If Leela is worse off than Morris, and has a lower social 
position than him, it is much more likely that she lacks responsibility for 
this divergence than in the cases of Max and Neil, who are worse off than 
Morris but—respectively—have equal or higher social position. 
This observation, in turn, helps to rationalize both of the status-based 
restrictions inherent in the social-gradient approach—status-based 
restrictions (1) and (2), above—if finer-grained techniques for determining 
Leela’s, Max’s, and Neil’s responsibility are not available. Let us now, 
therefore, consider “equality of opportunity” metrics—a recent 
development in scholarship on equity—which purport to offer a general 
methodology for parsing between responsibility and non-responsibility 
factors in the measurement of equity. 
V. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY METRICS 
Systematic work on adjusting equity metrics to take account of 
individual responsibility begins, in the 1990s, with John Roemer’s 
scholarship, itself inspired by the philosophical explorations, starting yet a 
decade earlier, of responsibility-sensitive egalitarians such as Dworkin and 
Arneson.125 Roemer proposes to separate between an individual’s 
“circumstances” (the characteristics for which she lacks responsibility) and 
her “effort” (the characteristics for which she bears responsibility).126 An 
individual’s level of attainment, with respect to some currency (be it health, 
income, utility, etc.), given some government policy, would be a function 
both of her “circumstances” and of her “effort.”127 
The population can, in principle, be separated into different 
“circumstance” classes, defined by a particular cluster of “circumstance” 
attributes. For example, if the individual’s race, urban or rural place of 
birth, and parental education (defined, e.g., as whether both parents 
 
125. For presentations and theoretical discussions of Roemer’s approach, see JOHN E. ROEMER, 
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY (1998); John E. Roemer, On Several Approaches to Equality of 
Opportunity, 28 ECON. & PHIL. 165 (2012); John E. Roemer, Defending Equality of Opportunity, 86 
MONIST 261 (2003); John E. Roemer, Equality of Opportunity: A Progress Report, 19 SOC. CHOICE & 
WELFARE 455 (2002); MARC FLEURBAEY, FAIRNESS, RESPONSIBILITY & WELFARE ch. 8 (2008); 
Matthias Hild & Alex Voorhoeve, Equality of Opportunity and Opportunity Dominance, 20 ECON. & 
PHIL. 117 (2004); Erwin Ooghe et al., Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Opportunity Sets, 28 
SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 209 (2007); Mathias Risse, What Equality of Opportunity Could Not Be, 112 
ETHICS 720 (2002). Empirical applications are cited infra note 134. 
126. John E. Roemer, Equality of Opportunity: A Progress Report, 19 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 
455 (2002). 
127. Id. 
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graduated high school) are each “circumstance” attributes, then white 
individuals born in cities whose parents have both graduated high school is 
one circumstance class, white individuals born in rural areas whose parents 
have both graduated high school is another circumstance class, etc. 
Similarly, the population can be divided into different “effort” classes. 
“Effort” as well as “circumstance” may be difficult to observe—raising 
econometric questions—but in principle each cluster of “effort” attributes 
defines an “effort” class. For example, if the individual’s education level 
(as contrasted with the level of education of her parents), and whether she 
engages in regular exercise, are “effort” attributes, then high school-
educated individuals who engage in regular exercise would be one “effort” 
class, high school-educated individuals who don’t regularly exercise a 
second, etc. 
A governmental policy, then, corresponds to a matrix.128 The rows of 
the matrix are “circumstance” classes. The columns are “effort” classes. 
The entry in each “cell” of the matrix is the attainment level, in the chosen 
currency, of individuals in the corresponding effort class and circumstance 
class. A policy will yield a particular such attainment level for each cell 
(circumstance-effort pairing); there will also be a particular number of 
individuals at each circumstance-effort pairing. For simplicity, my 
presentation of the Roemer approach and variations will assume that the 
number of such individuals is the same.129 
How to rank matrices? Roemer proposes to do so in a manner that will 
be sensitive to equity, but more specifically will see inequality of 
attainment due to variation in circumstance—not inequality of attainment 
due to variation in effort—as inequitable. Yet more specifically, Roemer 
suggests the following responsibility-egalitarian rule for ranking matrices. 
(1) For a given policy P, and a given effort class e, determine the lowest 
level of attainment of any circumstance class making effort e. Call this 
value min(P, e). (2) Assign P an overall value by summing the min(P, e) 
values across all the effort classes. (3) Choose the policy with the greatest 
such value. 
An obvious objection to the Roemer approach is that it focuses solely 
on the worst-off individual within each effort grouping. Assume that there 
are three or more circumstance classes, and that policy Pʹ—within each 
effort class—improves the attainment of the second-worst-off individual, at 
the expense of the best-off individual. Then Pʹ is, plausibly, both (1) a more 
 
128. Or, more generally, to a probability distribution over such matrices—but issues of 
uncertainty are ignored here. See supra note 77. 
129. See Ooghe et al., supra note 125, at 211, 214 (adopting this assumption for Roemer-leximin 
and discussing how it might be relaxed). 
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egalitarian policy than P, and (2) a better policy than P, all things 
considered. But the Roemer rule will rank Pʹ and P equally good. 
However, there is a rule closely related to the Roemer approach—call it 
Roemer-leximin—which has the effect of preferring Pʹ to P. Roemer-
leximin compares two policies by summing the lowest attainments in each 
effort class (if there are E effort classes, P is assigned the sum of the E 
lowest-in-effort-class values resulting from P, and Pʹ the sum of the E 
lowest-in-effort-class values resulting from Pʹ). If these sums are equal, the 
policies are compared by summing the second-lowest attainment levels 
within each effort class; if those are equal, by summing the third-lowest 
attainment levels within each effort class; etc.130 
How, exactly, does Roemer-leximin achieve the “trick” of seeing 
inequality due to circumstance, but not effort, as inequitable? To see this, 
intuitively, let us consider an especially simple case. Assume that policy P 
is such that circumstance classes can be unambiguously ranked from worst 
to best.131 Imagine, first, a policy Pʹ that erases all inequality within each 
effort class. Pʹ is such that each effort class (each column of the matrix) has 
exactly the same attainment level—namely, the average value of the 
corresponding column in P. Imagine, now, a different policy P* which 
erases all inequality within each circumstance class. Each such class (each 
row of the matrix) has exactly the same attainment level—namely, the 
average value of the corresponding row in P. Finally, P+ achieves full 
equality: every cell of the matrix has the same value (namely, the average 
value of all cells in P). 
Note, now, that Roemer-leximin will see P* (merely erasing inequality 
due to effort variation) as no improvement at all on P. By contrast, Pʹ 
(erasing inequality due to circumstantial variation) is ranked as an 
improvement. And P+ (complete equality) is no further improvement: P+ 
and Pʹ are ranked equally good by Roemer-leximin. See Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
130. See id. 
131. In other words, there are circumstance classes c1, c2, c3 . . . ; and, with policy P, the highest 
effort in c1 yields a lower attainment than the lowest effort in c2, the highest effort in c2 yields a lower 
attainment than the lowest effort in c3, etc. Again, this is an especially simple case; but it serves to 
illustrate in a dramatic way how Roemer-leximin separates between inequality due to circumstance and 
effort. 
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Since Roemer’s pioneering contributions, the literature on 
responsibility-sensitive equity metrics has blossomed. Such metrics are 
often, now, referred to as “equality-of-opportunity” metrics, although that 
is something of a misnomer—since the unifying feature of these metrics is 
not “opportunity” per se, but rather the “effort”/“circumstance” 
bifurcation—the distinction between those sources of differential 
attainment for which the affected individuals bear responsibility, versus 
those for which they don’t. Work in this vein includes empirical 
scholarship by Roemer and collaborators,134 as well as the development of 
alternative approaches for constructing responsibility-sensitive metrics.135 
Important alternatives to the Roemer methodology include these:  
(1) Equalizing the “options” of each type. As in the Roemer approach, 
each policy corresponds to a matrix, with circumstance groupings 
corresponding to rows and effort classes to columns. We assign each row a 
single “option” value, as a function of every cell in that row. (Most simply, 
this value is just the average of the entries—meaning the attainment of an 
individual in that circumstance grouping if she is equally likely to exert any 
of the effort levels.) Then each policy corresponds to a list of “option” 
values, one for each circumstance. And policies are then ranked by 
applying an inequality metric or SWF to these lists.136  
(2) Calculating what inequality of attainment would be, if efforts were 
identical. For a given matrix of circumstances, efforts, and resulting 
attainments, we can choose a particular effort class and predict what the 
distribution of attainments would be if everyone’s effort attributes were in 
that particular class, with their circumstances unchanged. And we can then 
 
text. For purposes of real-world policy assessment, the Roemer-leximin rule would of course need to 
relax that assumption, and (depending on how the rule is specified for the different-number case) the 
proviso might be relaxed as well. 
134. See, e.g., Humberto G. Llavador & John E. Roemer, An Equal-Opportunity Approach to the 
Allocation of International Aid, 64 J. DEV. ECON. 147 (2001); John E. Roemer et al., To What Extent 
Do Fiscal Regimes Equalize Opportunities for Income Acquisition Among Citizens? 87 J. PUB. ECON. 
539 (2003). 
135. Discussions of alternative approaches include:  FLEURBAEY, supra note 125; Rolf Aaberge 
et al., Measuring Long-Term Inequality of Opportunity, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 193 (2011); François 
Bourguignon et al., Inequality of Opportunity in Brazil, 53 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 585 (2007); 
Daniele Checchi & Vito Peragine, Inequality of Opportunity in Italy, 8 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 429 
(2010); Hild & Voorhoeve, supra note 125; Francisco H.G. Ferreira and Vito Peragine, Individual 
Responsibility, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D. Adler & 
Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); Arnaud Lefranc et al., Inequality of Opportunities vs. 
Inequality of Outcomes: Are Western Societies All Alike?, 54 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 513 (2008); 
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, On the Design of Equal-Opportunity Policies, 31 INVESTIGACIONES 
ECONÓMICAS 351 (2007);  Ooghe et al., supra note 125; Nicolas Pistolesi, Inequality of Opportunity in 
the Land of Opportunities, 1968-2001, 7 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 411 (2009); Giuseppe Pignataro, 
Equality of Opportunity: Policy and Measurement Paradigms, 26 J. ECON. SURVEYS 800 (2012) 
(reviewing many empirical studies implementing Roemer’s approach or alternatives); Juan Gabriel 
Rodriguez, Partial Equality-of-Opportunity Orderings, 31 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 435 (2008); 
Roemer, On Several Approaches, supra note 125. 
136. See Ooghe et al., supra note 125. 
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ascribe a degree of inequality to the matrix by applying an inequality 
metric to this counterfactual distribution of attainments. (The 
counterfactual distribution, of course, depends on which effort grouping 
everyone is hypothesized as falling into.)137  
(3) Calculating what inequality of attainment would be, if 
circumstances were identical. Symmetrically, starting with a matrix of 
circumstances, efforts, and resulting attainments, we can choose a 
particular circumstance class and predict what the distribution of 
attainments would be if everyone’s circumstances were in that class, with 
their effort attributes unchanged. The resulting counterfactual distribution 
is not unfair: it reflects just diversity in attainment due to diverse effort. 
Thus, by applying an inequality metric to the original distribution of 
attainments, and then subtracting the inequality number assigned to this 
counterfactual distribution, we arrive at a responsibility-adjusted inequality 
number for the original matrix.138 
Such alternative methodologies, like the Roemer-leximin approach, fail 
to satisfy the ordinary Pigou-Dalton principle: a transfer between 
individuals in different effort classes will not, necessarily, decrease the 
measured degree of inequity. However, like Roemer-leximin, they may 
well satisfy some appropriately restricted principle (focused, in some way, 
on transfers between individuals with different circumstances). 
Responsibility-adjustment is an important development in scholarship 
on equity measurement. First, it seeks concrete tools by which to express 
the compelling, but quite abstract, normative insights of Dworkin, Arneson, 
and other philosophers in their camp—tools more fine-grained than social-
gradient metrics. Second, (like any substantially new equity-measurement 
methodology) it may well offer a new “take” on any specific question of 
equity. Consider, for example, the question mooted in the Introduction: has 
the United States become a less equitable society over the last thirty-five 
years?  Pistolesi addressed this question using data from the Michigan 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which surveys a large group of U.S. 
individuals annually—ascertaining both the respondent’s earned (labor) 
income and certain other characteristics, in particular: the respondent’s age, 
the educational level of his parents, his father’s occupation, the 
respondent’s race, his region of birth, his own educational attainment, and 
the number of hours worked annually.139 Pistolesi classified the last two 
characteristics as “effort” attributes, and the others as “circumstance” 
attributes. He then estimated responsibility-adjusted inequality of U.S. 
income, on an annual basis, using the sample data and the two 
 
137. See Pistolesi, supra note 135, at 414–15. 
138. See Bourguignon et al., supra note 135;  Pistolesi, supra note 135, at 414–15. 
139. See Pistolesi, supra note 135. 
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“counterfactual” methodologies described in the previous paragraph. 
Pistolesi concluded that, while inequality of income increased dramatically 
between 1980 and 2000, responsibility-adjusted income inequality hardly 
increased at all.140 
To be sure, the day still seems far off when the responsibility-
adjustment approach becomes the dominant method for quantifying 
equity—displacing non-adjusted inequality metrics, poverty metrics, social 
welfare functions, and social-gradient metrics. The approach (at least as 
presently developed) has various limitations:  
(1) Distinguishing between circumstances and efforts. The approach, at 
its core, categorizes some attributes as efforts and others as circumstances. 
Such differentiation will inevitably be controversial. (For example, 
Pistolesi’s conclusion about the time trend of U.S. income inequality 
hinges on the quite contestable view that an individual is responsible for his 
education level and labor hours.) The responsibility-adjusted egalitarian 
might counter that such controversies are a virtue of the approach—that the 
approach brings to the surface normative questions that are both difficult, 
but also vital, for any truly nuanced assessment of equity, and that are 
ignored or “buried” by other methodologies. For example—she might 
say—the social-gradient methodology implicitly counts social class as a 
“circumstance” and all other attributes as an “effort.” Still, it is relevant to 
note—as a predictive, not normative matter—that the responsibility-
sensitive approach may fail to gain widespread traction just because any 
specific result will be vulnerable to criticism by those who reject the 
attendant effort/circumstance differentiation. 
(2) The diversity of approaches. A diverse array of distinct techniques 
exist for normalizing equity to “wash out” differential effort. I have 
described four, and the literature has explored yet further methods. 
Progress now needs to be made in clarifying the pros and cons of the 
different formats, and (ultimately) achieving some consensus on their 
relative preferability—akin to the convergence of the inequality-
measurement literature on a relatively short list of standard metrics, or the 
poverty-measurement literature on a preference for the FGT class. 
(3) Effort as a residual. Some approaches (not all) effectively define 
effort as a residual. For example, in much of his work, Roemer actually 
“infers” an individual’s effort from her attainment—by observing her 
percentile of attainment in the distribution of attainments for her 
circumstance—rather than using some independent attributes (labor hours, 
 
140. A more recent empirical study of responsibility-adjusted inequality in the U.S. is Gustavo A. 
Marrero & Juan G. Rodriguez, Inequality of Opportunity in the United States: Trends and 
Decomposition, in INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 217 (Juan Gabriel 
Rodriguez ed., 2011). 
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educational attainment, etc.) as a direct marker of effort.141 But doing so 
tends to overstate the role of differential effort in producing observed 
inequality, and (conversely) to understate the degree of genuine inequity 
associated with any given outcome or policy.142 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has surveyed a wide range of equity-sensitive metrics, and 
has brought to light their shared nexus to the Pigou-Dalton principle. All 
satisfy that principle in some form. Traditional income-inequality metrics 
do so with respect to income: a pure, non-rank-switching transfer of 
income, from someone with more income to someone with less, leaving 
everyone else’s income unchanged, reduces the degree of income 
inequality. Similarly, equity-regarding SWFs satisfy the Pigou-Dalton 
principle with respect to “utility”; multidimensional inequality and poverty 
metrics, with respect to a multiplicity of well-being relevant attributes; 
poverty metrics, in a “restricted” fashion defined by a poverty line; social-
gradient metrics, with a different sort of “restriction,” involving the relative 
social positions of transferee and transferor; and responsibility-sensitive 
approaches, with a normalization that takes account of individual 
“effort.”143 Risk and time create further orthogonal possibilities.144 
Differences in the specification of the Pigou-Dalton principle do not 
account for all differences in equity metrics,145 but go a long way. The 
Pigou-Dalton principle is truly the heart of equity, just as the Pareto 
principle is the heart of efficiency. But Pigou-Dalton has more “open 
texture” than the Pareto principle146—it seems to invite a wider range of 
plausible specifications—and it is this multiplicity that largely accounts for 
the diversity of equity metrics. 
The Article has not only taxonomized equity metrics, using the Pigou-
Dalton principle as the key organizing principle, but I have also taken a 
normative perspective—a welfarist one.147  Welfarism is not utilitarianism. 
 
141. See Hild & Vorhooeve, supra note 125, at 122–24; Ooghe et al., supra note 125, at 211; 
Roemer, Defending Equality of Opportunity, supra note 125, at 267–69; Roemer, Equality of 
Opportunity, supra note 125, at 461–63. See also Checchi & Peragine, supra note 135, at 432 
(discussing how their framework defines effort as a residual). 
142. Indeed, Roemer concedes as much. See Roemer, Equality of Opportunity, supra note 125, at 
463. 
143. See supra Part I. 
144. See supra note 77. 
145. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
146. As regards the open texture of the Pareto principle, see ADLER, supra note 28, at 52–53. 
Note that the present Article employs economists’ specific version of the principle, as a principle 
concerning preferences, and not the more general version which John Broome has termed the “principle 
of personal good” and which Well-Being and Fair Distribution employs. 
147. See supra Part II. 
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Welfarism and a concern for fair distribution can be—indeed, very 
plausibly should be—combined.148 
From this perspective, many of the current formats for measuring 
equity are imperfect. A better approach, in principle, would be to employ 
an equity-regarding SWF, suitably adjusted for responsibility.149 A well-
designed utility function would be sensitive to multiple sources of well-
being (unlike income, which ignores non-market sources);150 would covary 
with preferences (and thus avoid the conflicts with the Pareto principle that 
afflict multidimensional metrics);151 would have a discontinuity around the 
level of basic needs (obviating the need for poverty metrics);152 and would 
use social status as one determinant of utility (obviating one argument for 
social-gradient metrics). Systematic adjustment for differential effort would 
obviate a second argument for social-gradient metrics.153 
The key obstacles to this “first best” approach are twofold: (1) 
overcoming the heterogeneity of preferences in designing an 
interpersonally comparable measure of utility;154 and (2) arriving at a 
consensus format for the “effort” adjustment,155 so that utility is 
appropriately normalized to take account of individual responsibility.  
Some progress has been made on these two fronts, but much more remains 
to be done.  Putting a number on injustice is not a quixotic or hopeless task, 
but neither is it smooth sailing. Doing so means patiently refining tools and 
methodologies to mirror underlying normative commitments—whether 
those commitments center around human well-being or something else. 
 
 
 
 
 
148. See generally ADLER, supra note 28; Arneson, supra, note 90. 
149. See supra Part V; ADLER, supra note 28, at 579–84. 
150. See supra text accompanying note 86. 
151. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 114–117. 
153. See supra Section IV.B. 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 99–105. 
155. See supra Part V. 
